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 ,ntrodXction  
A group¶s performance is often constrained by its lowest performing individual.  An assembly 
line moves no faster than the slowest person in the line, a report doesn¶t get finished until the last person 
completes their section, and a meeting can¶t start when a key attendee is late.  *roups with such strong 
complementarities can easily become stuck in a performance trap everyone understands that all would 
benefit if all group members put forth their best effort, but, since no individual can unilaterally change the 
outcome for the better, all group members shirk in the belief that any attempt to break out of the 
performance trap is wasted effort.    
When a firm or any organization is stuck in a performance trap, spontaneous escape is unlikely 
given the need for coordinated change.  Leadership is usually required ± somebody has to take the 
initiative to start the process of change. Managerial leadership is an obvious possibility, but leadership by 
workers can also play an important role.  Help, defined as a voluntary activity by high ability types that 
makes the Mob of low ability types easier at some cost for the high ability types, is a natural instrument 
that workers can use to provide leadership.1  Intuitively, work teams often contain some workers that have 
higher ability than others.  If workers are rewarded based on team production, then high ability workers 
can have an incentive to help their less able colleagues.2  Help between workers has received little 
attention from researchers in economics and management.3  To the best of our knowledge, there exist no 
previous experimental papers on the topic of help. 
The purpose of this paper is to present laboratory experiments exploring the use of help as a 
leadership tool.  The provision and impact of help are complex phenomena involving interplay between 
the effects of material incentives, beliefs, and nonpecuniary motivations. Laboratory experiments are 
well suited for studying settings where such factors interact.4 The advantages of laboratory experiments 
for studying help are due to the control and observability available in experimental settings.  We 
exogenously control whether help is possible and directly observe how much help is provided.  We can 
                                                          
1 Other natural instruments that can be used to lead the way out of a performance trap include leading by example 
%randts and Cooper, 200 Hyndman, Terracol, and 9aksmann, 2009 and communication %lume and Ortmann, 
200, %randts and Cooper, 200. 
2 Hamilton et al. 2003, 2004 provide a real world example of this.  They study the productivity of worker teams in 
a garment plant.  Teams with heterogeneous abilities become more productive as the spread in ability increases 
holding the average fixed.  Hamilton et al. conMecture that this is due to mutual learning, a specific form of help 
where high ability types help low ability types understand how work should be done and pull them up to a higher 
level. 
3 6ee Drago and *arvey 199 for a questionnaire study on the effects of promotion incentives on help. 6ee also 
%rown and Heywood 2009 for a field study on help in settings with individual performance pay and Antonetti and 
5ufini 200 for a theoretical analysis of training of low ability types by high ability types.  
4 )or examples, see =wick and Chen 1999, %randts and Charness 2003, Weber and Camerer 2003 and Harbring 
and Irlenbusch 2009. 
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therefore cleanly determine whether help is responsible for observed changes in performance as opposed 
to other factors.   We can also observe the details of the interactive process of giving help and reacting to 
help, rather than only observing the final outcome, all of which makes it possible to pin down the 
mechanism by which help affects performance. While it is risky to generalize conclusions from a lab 
experiment to managerial choices in field settings, we believe that laboratory experiments are a valid tool 
for studying the effects of help.   
Our experimental results show that help is only effective if high ability types are forced to commit 
to providing help for an extended period of time.  To explain this result, we develop and estimate a 
structural model of learning that includes sophisticated learners.  This exercise indicates that the root 
cause of poor performance with help, in the absence of forced commitment, is ³overoptimism´ by high 
ability types believing incorrectly that they have taught others to play an efficient equilibrium, high 
ability types tend to prematurely abandon the provision of help.  This finding has implications for 
leadership in many settings and helps explains puzzling patterns from other studies of leadership.  
*etting into the details, our experiments are based on the ³corporate turnaround game.´5 This is 
an experimental setting designed to represent a corporate environment in which a group has fallen into a 
performance trap and needs to escape from it.  The game involves repeated play between a ³manager´ and 
four employees of a firm.  We automate the role of the manager while employees are played by 
experimental subMects.  In each round, the manager first chooses a bonus rate which determines the 
fraction of the firm
s profits transferred to the employees.  After seeing the bonus rate, the four employees 
simultaneously choose how much costly effort to expend with firm output and profits determined by the 
minimum effort.  Critically, the four employees are not identical.  Instead, each group has one high ability 
type with relatively low effort costs and three identical low ability types with relatively high effort costs.    
Employees initially face a low bonus rate that makes the minimum possible effort a dominant 
strategy for low ability types, trapping groups in the worst outcome possible.  The bonus rate is then 
exogenously increased, turning the game into a weak link game 9an Huyck, %attalio and %eil, 1990 
with multiple 3areto ranked equilibria.  Even with this change in incentives, the strong complementarities 
between workers¶ efforts make a spontaneous escape from the performance trap far from certain since 
improved performance requires a unanimous switch to higher effort.  
The key issue in our paper is whether high ability types can use help to assist the group¶s escape 
from the performance trap. We study two specific kinds of help, indirect and direct. We first consider 
indirect help which involves high ability types improving the productivity of low types at the cost of 
                                                          
5 The corporate turnaround game was introduced by %randts and Cooper 200.  6ee also Hamman, 5ick, and 
Weber 200.  More broadly, there exists an extensive literature on coordination in weaklink games.  Camerer 
2003 surveys the early literature.  3rominent recent papers include Chaudhuri, 6chotter and 6opher 200, Weber 
200, %lume and Ortmann 200 and .ogan, .wasnica and Weber 2011. 
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decreasing their own productivity. We refer to this as ³indirect´ because high ability workers do not 
spend time on the low ability workers¶ task, but instead make it possible for the low ability workers to 
accomplish their tasks more efficiently.  High ability types can gain by providing indirect help, even 
though their productivity is lowered, if low ability types increase their effort enough that the group 
escapes its performance trap. We defer introducing the direct help treatment until later, as the motivation 
for this treatment grew out of the results for the indirect help treatment. 
An initial set of treatments Experiment 1 includes four treatments that vary the ability of high 
ability types to provide indirect help.  In the Endogenous Help treatment, the high ability worker can help 
his low ability coworkers and the level of help can be changed on a roundtoround basis.  %ehavior in 
this treatment is compared with outcomes from two control treatments, one where help is not possible 1o 
Help and one where symmetric costs are imposed exogenously for the remainder of the interaction 
6ymmetric Costs.  More precisely, the latter treatment imposes the same cost structure as occurs when 
the high ability type chooses a sufficiently high level of help as to equalize effort costs.  We find that the 
ability to provide symmetric help on a roundtoround basis has no positive effect on the likelihood of 
efficient coordination as minimum effort levels are lower in the Endogenous Help treatment than in either 
the 1o Help or 6ymmetric costs treatments, albeit weakly in the first case.    
This surprisingly poor performance reflects neither a failure to use help nor a lack of 
responsiveness by minimum effort to changes in help.  Instead, the problem seems to stem from allowing 
high ability types to change their level of help on a roundbyround basis.   Many high ability types 
frequently shift the amount of help they provide up and down, causing the minimum effort to ratchet 
downwards for the group since the negative response to cutting help is stronger than the positive effect of 
increasing help.  This suggests that high ability types would do better if they committed to a level of help 
for an extended time period, but the Endogenous Help treatment is insufficient to reach this conclusion 
since high ability types might be changing help frequently because their group is doing badly.  In other 
words, there is a possibility of reverse causality.  
The final treatment of Experiment 1 )orced Commitment addresses this by forcing high ability 
types to commit to their chosen level of help including zero help for an extended period of time. )orced 
Commitment yields significantly higher minimum effort levels than either the Endogenous Help or the 
1o Help treatments.  Exogenously imposing commitment makes it easier to escape a performance trap 
because it gives groups time to equilibrate before help can be changed.  Having stabilized at an efficient 
outcome, subsequent reductions in help have little effect on the effort of low ability types. 
We develop and estimate a structural model that provides an explanation for why high ability 
types reduce help too rapidly in Endogenous Help, and, by extension, captures the main treatment effects 
observed in Experiment 1.  This is a simplified version of Camerer, Ho, and Chong¶s 2002 sophisticated 
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EWA model, combining the spirit of levelk reasoning with a learning model.  Learning models are 
inherently dynamic and hence well suited to studying the dynamic phenomena observed in our data.  
Including sophisticated learners in the model allows for individuals who anticipate learning and 
optimization by others.  Without this it becomes difficult to explain why help is used by high ability 
types, let alone why it is switched frequently.  
6ubMects are assumed to be one of two types, unsophisticated or sophisticated learners.  1ote that 
a subMect being a high low ability type does not imply they are a sophisticated unsophisticated learner, 
as the former is randomly and exogenously assigned by the experimenters while the latter is a behavioral 
characteristic of the individual.  As will be seen, the case of greatest interest occurs when a sophisticated 
learner is assigned to the high ability role as sophistication affects their use of help.  8nsophisticated 
learners follow a simple rule closely akin to Cournot learning.  6ophisticated learners noisily optimize 
versus unsophisticated learners and are forward looking.  6ophisticated learners anticipate the effect of 
changing incentives on others¶ behavior and understand the benefits of strategic teaching.  )or high 
ability types who are also sophisticated learners, help is an attractive tool.  %y giving shortterm 
incentives for higher effort, help not only changes the behavior of low ability types in the short run, but 
also affects the experiences on which their learning is based.  This pushes the learning dynamic towards 
equilibria with coordination at higher levels of effort.  Two additional features were added to the model 
based on specific features of our data. 1 Overoptimism 6ophisticated learners overestimate their ability 
to affect the beliefs of unsophisticated types and 2 5eciprocity Low ability workers reward kindness 
increased help by choosing higher effort levels and punish unkind behavior decreased help by moving 
to lower effort levels. 
To generate predictions from the model, we fit its parameters using data from the three treatments 
we are trying to track, 1o Help, Endogenous Help, and )orced Commitment.  The estimation is done via 
the simulated method of moments, minimizing the squared difference between the observed and 
simulated minimum effort averaging across periods and treatments.  The resulting parameters give the 
best fit averaging across treatments, but it does not follow that the model tracks differences between 
treatments especially well and it is easy to generate examples where models fit to the data make 
inaccurate predictions about differences between treatments.  Indeed, if we fit a version of the learning 
model with overoptimism and reciprocity removed and then simulate data for all three treatments using 
the estimated parameters, the constrained model fails to predict that )orced Commitment increases 
                                                          
 Crawford and %roseta 199 provide a notable example of using a learning model to track data from coordination 
game experiments.   
 6trategic teaching refers to attempts to alter others¶ future choices by manipulating their learning processes.  )or 
experimental evidence of strategic teaching see Terracol and 9aksmann 2009, Hyndman et al. 2009, )ehr et al. 
2012 and Hyndman et al. 2012. 
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minimum effort relative to 1o Help and Endogenous Help. 3erforming the same fitting and simulation 
exercise with the full unconstrained model i.e. including overoptimism and reciprocity, the simulations 
successfully tracks the differences between these three treatments. The estimated parameter for over
optimism is significant and positive, but, surprisingly, the estimated reciprocity parameter is tiny and not 
significant.  Overoptimism helps the model track the data because it increases the use of help and, more 
importantly, leads to premature reductions of help as observed in the data.  A high ability type who is 
sophisticated and overoptimistic will abandon help too rapidly, believing he has led his group to the 
efficient equilibrium before this has actually occurred.  5eciprocity is a powerful force in many 
experimental settings see Cooper and .agel, forthcoming, but adding a simple, natural version of 
reciprocity to our model harms its ability to track the data.  In our model, sophisticated learners believe 
the other subMects are unsophisticated learners who noisily optimize subMect to beliefs.  If reciprocity is 
added to the model, the obMective function of low ability types changes. A high ability type who is 
sophisticated anticipates that reciprocity affects the choices of low ability types, expecting a more positive 
effect when help is increased and a more negative effect when help is reduced.  Like overoptimism, 
adding reciprocity increases usage of help, but, unlike overoptimism, reciprocity makes reducing help 
less attractive.  This limits the model¶s ability to capture the overly rapid reductions of help that play such 
an important role in our data.   
To recapitulate, we learn three important things from the structural model 1 sophisticated 
learners must be included to generate use of help, 2 adding overoptimism allows the model to track the 
differences between treatments by causing high ability types to abandon help too quickly, and 3 adding 
reciprocity does not help the model track the data because this feature discourages high ability types from 
abandoning help too quickly. 
Experiment 1 studies indirect help, but this is Must one of many possible ways in which help could 
be provided.  To study whether the importance of commitment generalizes to other natural versions of 
help, Experiment 2 examines ³direct´ help. This involves high ability types spending time on the low 
ability types¶ task, allowing the low ability types to do less work to complete their tasks. Help is direct 
because high ability workers do a portion of the low ability types¶ work rather than making it easier for 
low ability types to do their own work as with indirect help. Experiment 2 studies direct help with and 
without forced commitment. In the first treatment high ability types choose help on a roundbyround 
basis while in the second they commit to their chosen level of help for an extended period of time. 
Without commitment the effect of allowing direct help is negative, with minimum effort levels greatly 
reduced relative to the relevant control, the 1o Help treatment.  )orced commitment again improves 
performance.  The reasons for this improvement parallel those from the indirect help treatments. The 
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 
results of Experiment 2 reinforce our main conclusion the efficacy of help as an instrument for leading 
groups out of performance traps depends critically on the commitment of leaders to providing help. 
More broadly, our theoretical and experimental results suggest that stable behavior is a 
characteristic of successful leadership with a broad variety of tools employed for escaping performance 
traps.  )or example, in %randts and Cooper 200 leadership could be exercised by managers, played by 
subMects rather than the computer, who controlled the bonus rate.  The bonus rate was changed by 
managers in almost 23 of the periods.  Managers who were below the median frequency of switching 
earned about 50 more than managers at or above the median 39 vs 20 EC8round.  This parallels 
the negative effect due to excessive switching of help observed in the Endogenous Help and Direct Help 
treatments.  The insight is the same in all cases. 5ecoordinating on a good equilibrium is a gradual 
process.  Once this process has finished, the good outcome can persist even if incentives are changed, but 
if incentives change before equilibration has a chance to occur then coordination on a good equilibrium 
may likely not occur.  Institutions that tie leaders¶ hands can have a positive effect by preventing 
premature abandonment of costly yet effective instruments for overcoming coordination failure.   
 7Ke 7XrnaroXnd Game and ,ndirect Help  
The ³turnaround game´ is played by a fixed group ³firm´ consisting of a manager and four 
employees who interact repeatedly over a number of rounds.  The firm¶s productivity in each round is 
determined by employees¶ effort choices for the round, with employees¶ incentives to exert effort 
depending on an ex ante profit sharing decision made by the manager.  In the experiments reported below 
the experimenter plays the role of manager while experimental subMects fill the roles of the employees.  
6ince our focus is on interactions between high and low ability employees, making the manager 
exogenous generates a more controlled environment to study their relations. Even though the manager¶s 
decisions are exogenous, it is useful for expositional purposes to treat her as a player in the game.   
The turnaround game embodies three basic design choices. )irst, the firm¶s technology has a 
weaklink structure, with production as well as profits depending in every round on the minimum effort 
chosen by an employee.  1o employee can unilaterally increase the firm¶s production.  6econd, the 
manager observes the output produced and, hence, observes the minimum effort but does not observe any 
of the individual effort levels.  This implies that any incentives the manager gives employees cannot 
depend on individual effort.  )inally, the firm manager can only reward employees with bonuses based on 
the minimum effort observed.  6he can change this bonus rate but cannot otherwise influence the 
employees¶ choices.  In what follows we present the main features of the turnaround game in more detail. 
                                                          
 This figure pools data from all three treatments with subMects playing as managers and controlling the bonus rate.  
The three treatments varied the ability of managers and workers to communicate. 
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An experimental firm in the turnaround game consists of a fixed grouping of four subMects 
employees who interact for thirty consecutive rounds, broken into three tenround blocks.  Each block 
starts with the announcement of a common bonus rate % for the ten rounds of the block that determines 
how much additional pay each employee receives for each unit increase in the minimum effort of the four 
employees. While playing in a block with a particular bonus rate, subMects did not know what the bonus 
rate would be in subsequent tenround blocks. The bonus transfers part of the firm¶s profits from the 
manager to the employees.  All four employees observe % and then simultaneously choose effort levels, 
where Ei is the effort level chosen by the ith employee. We restrict an employee
s effort to be in ten hour 
increments Ei ∈ ^0, 10, 20, 30, 40`.  Intuitively, employees spend forty hours per week on the Mob, and 
effort measures the number of these hours that they actually work hard rather than loafing.  Employees¶ 
payoffs are determined by Equation 1 below.  1ote that effort is costly, with Ci denoting the cost of a unit 
of effort for the ith employee.  All payoffs are denominated in ³experimental currency units´ EC8s.  
These were converted to monetary payoffs at a rate of 1 euro equals 500 EC8s 
Employee i  
^ ` ie i i MM 1,2,3,4ʌ 200 C E % min E§ ·   u¨ ¸© ¹       
In all treatments the average cost of effort equals ,   1 1 2 3 44i.e. C   C   C   C     . Employee 
1 is a high ability type with a low initial effort cost C1  1 while the other three employees are low ability 
types with high initial effort costs C2   C3  C4  9.  In treatments with help, as described in 6ection 3, the 
final effort costs will differ from these as a function of how much help is provided.   
In all treatments the first ten rounds were played with %    and without the possibility of help. 
Table 1 shows the resulting payoffs for the two ability types for the case of % .  With %  the game is 
not a weakestlink game.  )or a high ability low cost type the best response depends on the minimum 
effort of the other workers, but for low ability high cost types it is a dominant strategy to choose zero 
effort.  In the unique 1ash equilibrium all employees exert zero effort. We use the game with %  in the 
first block of ten rounds to get play stuck in a performance trap.  This cannot be classified as coordination 
failure since there is a unique equilibrium, but sets a strong precedent of low effort for games where 
coordination at high effort is possible in equilibrium.  
>Table 1 around here@ 
The final twenty rounds in all treatments are played with %   14.  Table 2 shows the new payoff 
tables for the two types of employees if effort costs are held fixed at their original levels. The game is 
now a weakestlink game. Coordination by all four employees on any of the five available effort levels is 
an equilibrium, but consider the incentives faced by employees if they try to move upwards from the 
lowest minimum effort level.  )or simplicity assume that all employees choose 0 or 40.  )or a high ability 
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low cost type, the incentives are fairly good.  Increasing effort to 40 incurs a sunk effort cost of 40 
EC8s in exchange for a potential gain of 520 EC8s.  )or this increase to have positive expected value, 
the probability of the three low ability high cost types all increasing to effort level 40 must only be 
greater than 114.  The odds are more foreboding for low ability high cost types.  They must sink an 
effort cost of 30 EC8s and can only potentially gain 200 EC8s.  )or a positive expected payoff, the 
probability of the high ability type and both low ability types increasing their effort to 40 must be greater 
than 914.  Low ability types must be far more optimistic than high ability types to be willing to take the 
risk of increasing their effort levels. 
>Table 2 around here@ 
The advantage of high ability low cost types only matters if they can get low ability high cost 
types to increase their effort.  The flip side of high ability types having good incentives to try to 
coordinate is that they also have strong incentives to try to influence the turnaround process. They can do 
this by helping low ability types.  
 Experiment : 7Ke Effect of ,ndirect Help  
There are many ways in which workers can help each other, and no one experiment can capture 
all of the possibilities.  We sought kinds of help that were easily implemented in the context of the 
turnaround game, did not fundamentally change the nature of the game being played, and had natural 
analogs in relevant field settings.  When implementing help in our experiment, we made choices along 
several dimensions.  We restricted ourselves to implementations where help is ³efficiency neutral,´ 
meaning the total surplus at the efficient equilibrium is unaffected by the provision of help.  Our goal was 
to emphasize the use of help as a leadership tool rather than as a means of directly improving 
productivity.  We also restricted ourselves to types of help that have a temporary effect on costs rather 
than a permanent one.  8sing help with a temporary effect goes hand in hand with making help efficiency 
neutral.  It also simplifies the dynamic optimization problem facing subMects.  We want subMects focused 
on the tradeoff between the current costs of help and the long term gains from coordinating on an efficient 
equilibrium without also needing to consider the long term implications for effort costs.  )inally, both 
indirect and direct help have natural interpretations in the context of escaping performance traps.  We 
examine indirect help first.  
We model indirect help as a voluntary activity by which the high ability low effort cost worker 
reduces the effort cost of a low ability high effort cost type at the expense of increasing his own effort 
cost.  To make this more concrete, imagine an experienced worker who volunteers to keep an eye on a 
Munior colleague.  6he stops what she¶s doing occasionally to check on her colleague.  3ossibly she 
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catches a mistake before it becomes difficult and timeconsuming to fix.  The Munior colleague does his 
own work, but the advice from his senior colleague makes it easier for him to do it. Of course, this has a 
cost for the person giving advice since she must take time and focus away from her own work to monitor 
her colleague.   
To make indirect help efficiency neutral, we model the cost of help as being 1 to 1 ± lowering a 
low ability type¶s effort cost by one unit raises the high ability type¶s effort cost by one unit.  )or 
example, if the high ability worker decides to reduce the effort cost of all three low ability workers by 
one, the effort cost of these three workers decreases from 9 to , while the effort cost of the high ability 
worker increases from 1 to 1  3 x 1   4. To simplify the experiment, low ability types are not allowed 
to help others.  Only allowing one player to provide help eliminates additional coordination problems 
such as who is supposed to be providing leadership if more than one individual provides it. 
 Experiment 1 comprises a total of four treatments which are summarized in Table 3. The results 
of the first three treatments led us to the conMecture that commitment is crucial for performance 
improvement. The fourth treatment, )orced Commitment, is designed to demonstrate that there is a causal 
relationship between commitment and escaping a performance trap.  We defer describing this treatment 
until after the results of the first three treatments have been presented. 
>Table 3 around here@ 
All treatments in Experiment 1 are identical in rounds 110 but vary with respect to how the effort 
costs are determined in rounds 11 ± 30.  5ecall that during the first ten rounds effort costs were 
exogenously fixed in all treatments at C1   1, C2   C3   C4   9.  In the 1o Help treatment, help is not 
possible and effort costs remained exogenously fixed at the initial levels throughout rounds 11 ± 30.  In 
the Endogenous Help treatment, the high ability employee Employee 1 has, in rounds 11 ± 30, the 
option of providing each low ability employee Employees 2 ± 4 with 0, 1, 2, 3 or 4 units of help 
^ `H  1,2,3,4  before effort decisions for the current round are made.  In other words, the high ability 
type worker commits to one of the possible levels of help for the current round but not for future rounds. 
To keep matters simple, each low ability type must be given the same amount of help.  After each round 
all employees are informed about effort choices in the round.   
)or the first three levels of help, used in 94 of all observations, offering help corresponds to 
a. H   0 Leaving the effort cost distribution at 1, 9, 9, 9. 
b. H   1 5educing each of the three coworker¶s effort cost by 1 and increasing own effort cost 
by 3, leading to a cost distribution of 4, , , . 
c. H   2 5educing each of the three coworker¶s effort cost by 2 and increasing own effort cost 
by , leading to a distribution of , , , . 
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Help levels 3 and 4 modify the distribution of effort costs in an analogous way.  At these help 
levels Employee 1 assists the others so much that her costs of effort are higher than those of low ability 
types.  It is therefore not surprising that in our results the use of help levels 3 and 4 is rare. 
In the 6ymmetric Costs treatment, the distribution of effort costs is exogenously switched for 
%locks 2 and 3 to the symmetric distribution with a common effort cost of .  This is equivalent to 
exogenously imposing H   2, although without any of the intentionality and hence the scope for 
reciprocity that may be attributed to the active provision of help.  Effort costs in the 6ymmetric Costs 
treatment were held constant for tenround blocks, a fact which was common knowledge among 
employees. In this treatment there is effectively a commitment to H   2 for the tenround block.  
>Table 4 around here@ 
6ection  contains a formal model designed to explore why )orced Commitment increases 
minimum effort levels while Endogenous Help does not, but our original hypothesis about differences 
between the 1o Help and Endogenous Help treatments were more intuitive in nature.  Help, whether 
provided endogenously or imposed exogenously, does not change the basic structure of the resulting 
game. Any subgame that occurs after choosing a level of help is still a weakestlink game with five 3areto 
ranked equilibria, but the costs and benefits of trying to coordinate on an efficient equilibrium are 
changed.  )or example, set H   2.  This is the level of help imposed in the 6ymmetric Costs treatment and 
most common level of help provided in the Endogenous Help treatment. The resulting payoff table is 
shown in Table 4 there is only one payoff table since all players have an effort cost of .  Consider the 
incentives to move from 0 to 40.  This requires a sunk effort cost of 20 EC8s versus a potential gain of 
20 EC8s.  To have a positive expected payoff, the probability of all three other players increasing their 
effort to 40 must be greater than 12.  This is an improvement over the equivalent figure of 914 for low 
ability types in the absence of help. Incentives are worsened for high ability types compared to H   0, but 
we conMecture that they provide help in the expectation of changing the behavior of low ability types and 
hence should be willing to provide high effort even with lowered incentives. 
 
Hypothesis 1:  Minimum effort will be higher in the Endogenous Help treatment than in the No Help 
treatment. 
 
 3rocedXres  
6ubMects were students of the 8niversity of 9alencia recruited through an electronic recruitment 
system. All sessions were run at the LI1EE; computer lab of the 8niversity of 9alencia. 6ubMects were 
only allowed to participate in a single session and had no previous experience in similar experiments.   
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At the beginning of each session subMects were randomly seated. 3rinted instructions were 
distributed and read aloud by the experimenter.  The instructions stress that there are two types of 
employees with differing payoff tables and that the groups were fixed for the duration of the experiment. 
%efore beginning play, all subMects were asked to complete a short quiz about the payoffs and the rules of 
the experiment.  The instructions for the endogenous help treatment are shown in Appendix A.   
At the beginning of each tenround block employees were informed of the bonus rate for that 
block.  Employees were not told what bonus rates would be in subsequent blocks.  Treatments differed in 
what happened before employees made their effort decision. In each round of the 1o Help and 6ymmetric 
costs treatments the four employees of a firm simultaneously chose their effort levels for the round.  
While choosing, the employees were shown a payoff table, similar Tables 1 and 2 above, showing their 
payoff as a function of their own effort level and the minimum effort level chosen by the other 
employees. This payoff table was automatically adMusted to reflect the current bonus rate.  6ubMects also 
had a printed copy of the payoff table for employees with different effort costs. 
At the end of each round, all employees saw a feedback screen showing them their effort level, 
the minimum effort for their firm, their payoff for the round, and their running total payoff for the 
experiment. 6eparate windows on the feedback screen showed a summary of results from earlier rounds 
and the individual effort levels selected for all four employees in their firm.  These effort levels were 
sorted from highest to lowest and did not include any identifying information about which employee was 
responsible for which effort level.9 
6ubMects in treatments involving help received additional printed instruction before the start of the 
second block explaining how help worked.  These instructions explained the way in which help could 
take place and provided all possible payoff tables that could occur for either type of player with some 
feasible level of help.  6ubMects were not told about the possibility of help prior to this point in time, so all 
treatments are parallel until the beginning of the second block.  6ubMects in the 1o Help and 6ymmetric 
costs treatments did not receive new instructions prior to the second block, but did have a pause in play 
where they were told about changes in the bonus rate and when relevant cost structure. 
The timing of rounds 11 ± 30 in the Endogenous Help treatment as well as subsequent treatments 
with help differs from that in the other two treatments of Experiment 1.  After seeing the feedback from 
the previous round, the high ability type selected a level of help.  All employees saw the level of help 
selected, as well as the resulting costs for the two types, and then simultaneously made effort decisions.  
The payoff table shown while making this decision adMusted to reflect the amount of help provided by the 
high ability type.  3rinted payoff tables were available to see the payoffs of the other type. 
                                                          
9 *iven the symmetry of help the absence of identifying information seemed to us to be the simplest choice. 
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At the end of the session, each subMect was privately paid in cash for all rounds played plus a 
showup fee.   The average total payoff was ¼21.0, including a five euro showup fee.   
 
 ,nitial 5esXlts and a 1ew 7reatment 
)igure 1 shows average minimum effort in the four treatments of Experiment 1, including the 
)orced Commitment treatment that we introduce below.  In round 10, the last round prior to the bonus 
rate increase, all firms had a minimum effort of zero.  This is important since a history of low effort is a 
precondition for our environment to be of interest. 
>)igure 1 around here@ 
)igure 1 shows that minimum effort is slightly lower in the Endogenous Help treatment than in 
the 1o Help sessions and higher in the 6ymmetric Costs treatment than in either the Endogenous Help or 
1o Help treatments.  Comparing average effort at the employee level rather than minimum effort at the 
firm level yields a similar picture.   
5egression analysis contained in Appendix % Table %.1 provides formal statistical backing for 
the preceding observations.   The ordered probit regressions reported in Appendix % correct for clustering 
at the group level and include controls for behavior in the initial phase, 5ounds 1 ± 10.    The regression 
results reinforce our conclusions from the raw data  Endogenous Help does not significantly increase 
firm production as measured by minimum effort relative to the baseline given by the 1o Help treatment. 
Although 6ymmetric Costs somewhat improves matters, the difference between this treatment and 1o 
Help is also not significant.  The only significant difference we find between the three initial treatments is 
between the Endogenous Help and 6ymmetric Costs treatments in 5ounds 21 ± 30, and this is very weak. 
The data reMects Hypothesis 1. 
Comparisons of payoffs across the three initial treatments reveal surprising patterns. 3ayoffs for 
high ability low cost types are identical in the 6ymmetric Costs and Endogenous Help treatments, 
averaging 350 EC8s over 5ounds 11 ± 30, but substantially lower in both cases than the average payoff 
of 455 EC8s with 1o Help.10  3ayoffs for low ability high cost types are roughly the same in the 
Endogenous Help and 1o Help treatments, averaging 2 and 24 EC8s respectively across 5ounds 11 ± 
30. %oth of these figures are substantially lower than the average payoff for the 6ymmetric Costs 
                                                          
10 5unning OL6 regressions with high ability type profits as the dependent variable and using equivalent 
specifications to those described in Appendix %, the difference in high ability type payoffs between the 1o Help and 
the Endogenous Help 6ymmetric Costs Help treatment is statistically significant at the 5 1 level in 5ounds 
11 ± 20 and at the 10 10 level in 5ounds 21 ± 30. 
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treatment across this time frame, 34 EC8s.11  It isn¶t a shock that Endogenous Help makes high ability 
types worse off ± after all, help is costly ± but it is surprising that Endogenous Help does not make low 
ability types better off even though they benefit from receiving help.  
  
Conclusion 1: Endogenous Help and Symmetric Costs do not improve firm productivity, as measured by 
minimum effort.  The data does not support Hypothesis 1 . 
 
 
One possible explanation for why the Endogenous Help treatment does not increase minimum 
effort levels relative to the 1o Help treatment could be that help is used infrequently or at very low levels.  
However, strictly positive help is provided in 0 of observations, 3 of 39 high ability types 95 
provide positive help at least once, and 3 of 39 high ability types 92 provide positive help in at least 
25 of the rounds. An average of 1.21 units of help per low ability type are provided, a level which 
changes little over time. The lack of a positive effect from the Endogenous Help treatment does not reflect 
a failure by high ability types to use their ability to provide help.    
 Looking at changes in help rather than levels provides a better idea for why minimum effort is 
unexpectedly low in Endogenous Help. High ability types frequently changed how much help they 
provided.  The median number of changes in 20 rounds was , or roughly one change every three rounds.  
About a quarter of the high ability types, 10 of 39, changed the level of help in at least half of the rounds.  
There are only three help levels that get frequent use, so many high ability types oscillated back and forth 
between high and low help levels.  )igure 2 shows the relation between the number of changes in help 
and both the minimum effort levels of low ability types and the payoffs of high ability types.  )irms from 
the Endogenous Help treatment are broken into categories by how many times the level of help was 
changed in 5ounds 11 ± 30.  There is an obvious negative relationship between instability in help levels 
and either minimum effort or profit levels.  
>)igure 2 around here@ 
)requent changes to the level of help imply both frequent increases and frequent decreases.  
)igure 3 illustrates why the decreases are particular harmful.  It shows the effect of the high ability type 
changing the level of help on the average minimum effort level of the three low ability types in a firm.12  
Data is taken from 5ounds 12 ± 30.  5ound 11 is excluded since the effect of help is confounded with the 
bonus rate increase.  Changes in the amount of help unambiguously affect the minimum effort of the three 
                                                          
11 5egression analysis finds that the differences in low ability type payoffs between the 6ymmetric costs treatment 
and the Endogenous Help and 1o Help treatments are statistically significant in 5ounds 11 ± 20 at the 5 level and 
at the 1 level in 5ounds 21 ± 30.   
12 An observation here is the minimum effort by the three low ability types in a firm for a single round. 
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low ability types. When the lagged minimum effort of the low ability types is 0, an increase is the only 
possible change.  6uch improvement mainly occurs when help is increased.  If the lagged minimum effort 
for the three low ability types is 40, only decreases are possible.  This is far more likely after a decrease in 
the level of help.  The most interesting case is when the lagged minimum effort level for low ability types 
is 10, 20, or 30.  *iven that most groups which successfully coordinate do so gradually, these cases are 
critical ones in determining a firm¶s success.  Increasing help or holding it constant only has a moderate 
positive effect on minimum effort levels for low ability types, but decreasing help has a strong negative 
effect on their minimum effort levels.13   
>)igure 3 around here@ 
Ordered probit regressions see Table %.2 in the appendix provide formal evidence that the 
response of low ability types¶ minimum effort to changes in help is asymmetric.  These regressions 
include controls for the lagged minimum effort of low ability types, time effects, and individual effects.  
6ummarizing the results, either increasing or decreasing help leads to statistically significant changes in 
the minimum effort of low ability types.  %y itself, the current level of help does not have a significant 
relationship with changes in effort.  Changing help, not the level of help, causes changes in effort.  The 
negative effect of decreasing help is estimated to be almost three times as large as the positive effect of 
increasing help.  
*iven the large negative consequences of decreasing help, it is puzzling that high ability types 
frequently change the level of help. Two features of the data suggest an explanation for this behavior.  
)irst, decreases in help primarily occur when lagged minimum effort is high.14  Just as things start going 
well, high ability types tend to throw a wrench in the works by decreasing help.  This is consistent with 
premature attempts at profit taking by high ability types.  We conMecture high ability types are too 
optimistic about having gotten the firm out of its performance trap and reduce the help they provide, 
failing to anticipate a drop in the effort of others.  A second feature of our data supports this 
interpretation.  Consider observations in 5ounds 12 ± 30 where the minimum effort of others in the 
previous round was strictly positive 10, 20, 30, or 40.  When help is cut, 93 of high ability types either 
choose the same effort level as the previous period or increase it.  Increased effort is more than four times 
as likely as decreased effort.15 This tendency by high ability types to couple decreases in help with 
                                                          
13 The response of individual effort levels to changes in help are also asymmetric, but less so than minimum effort of 
the low ability types.  The minimum function accentuates the asymmetry. 
14 A decrease of help is 0 more likely than an increase when the lagged minimum effort of low ability types is 
strictly positive. 
15 There are 23 increases and 5 decreases out of 9 total observations.  If we limit the sample to cases where the 
lagged effort was neither 0 nor 40, so changes in both directions are possible, these figures become 14 increases and 
3 decreases out of 2 total observations. 
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increases in their own effort only makes sense if the low ability workers are not expected to react to the 
decrease in help by cutting their effort. 
Conclusion 2: Our analysis of the dynamics in the Endogenous Help treatment suggests that a lack of 
commitment by high ability types, especially a tendency to slash help when things are going well, leads to 
poor performance in the treatment.   
 
Conclusion 2 is largely based on the negative relationship between frequent changes in help and 
the minimum effort achieved by a firm, as illustrated by )igure 2, but the evidence provided by the 
Endogenous Help treatment is not sufficient to establish a causal relation between these two variables.  
)requent switches might be caused by poor performance rather than the other way around.  The )orced 
Commitment treatment, the final treatment in Experiment 1, is designed to establish a causal relationship 
between commitment and increased minimum effort.1 In this treatment, the high ability low cost type 
chooses how much help to provide only in 5ounds 11 and 21.  In these two rounds, she sets the level of 
help in exactly the same fashion as in the Endogenous Help treatment, choosing from H ∊ ^1, 2, 3, 4`. 
The effort cost of all three low ability high cost types is lowered by H and the high ability type¶s effort 
cost increases by 3H.  As in the Endogenous Help treatment, the same amount of help must be provided 
to all three low ability types.  8nlike the Endogenous Help treatment, where help is chosen for each 
round, in the )orced Commitment treatment the high ability type must stick to his decision for the entire 
tenround block.  This prevents the frequent changes to the level of help observed in the Endogenous Help 
treatment.  Effort levels are still chosen roundbyround as in the other treatments. 
 Hypothesis 2 follows from our interpretation of behavior in the Endogenous Help treatment. 
Without forced commitment, overly optimistic high ability types tend to decrease help too soon. In the 
presence of forced commitment this premature reduction of help is not possible, facilitating successful 
equilibration at a higher effort level.1 
Hypothesis 2: Minimum effort will be higher for the Forced Commitment treatment than for either the No 
Help or Endogenous Help treatments. 
                                                          
1 The 6ymmetric Costs treatment also introduces an element of commitment, since workers are told in 5ounds 11 
and 21 that effort costs will be set equal across all four workers for the next ten rounds.  This is mathematically 
equivalent to imposing a commitment to provide two units of help.  However, the comparison with the Endogenous 
Help treatment is not clean due to multiple confounds help is forced to be at a high level, help cannot be adMusted in 
reaction to the initial response of the low ability types, and help is imposed exogenously rather than being set by one 
of the four workers. 
1 When looking at the data from the first three treatments of Experiment 1, we noticed that groups which performed 
poorly were often held back by low effort choices from a single worker.  This suggested that allowing for 
asymmetric provision of help, with different levels of help provided to different workers, might be more effective 
than the symmetric help allowed in Endogenous Help.  We tested this hypothesis with a treatment that allowed 
asymmetric provision of help.  This improved minimum effort levels, but the effect was small and not statistically 
significant.  )or details, see %randts, Cooper, and )atas 2011. 
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5eturning to )igure 1, we now focus on the )orced Commitment treatment.  This treatment yields 
obviously higher minimum efforts than either the 1o Help or Endogenous Help treatments, a difference 
that grows between the first and second block.  Minimum efforts in the )orced Commitment treatment are 
also moderately higher than in the 6ymmetric costs treatment for both blocks.  Looking at effort rather 
than minimum effort leads to similar conclusions ± the )orced Commitment treatment leads to a 
substantial and persistent increase in effort levels over the 1o Help and Endogenous Help treatments.   
3ayoffs improve for both types in the )orced Commitment treatment relative to the Endogenous 
Help treatment, with average payoffs over 5ounds 11 ± 30 of 413 vs. 350 EC8s for high ability types and 
34 vs. 2 EC8s for low ability types.  Over the final ten rounds, average payoffs for both types are 
roughly as high in the )orced Commitment treatment as in the best of the other three treatments.1   
The regression analysis described in Appendix % Table %.1 supports our conclusions about 
)orced Commitment.  Compared with either the 1o Help or Endogenous Help treatments, the )orced 
Commitment treatment leads to significantly higher minimum effort and effort levels in 5ounds 21 ± 30 
than in either the 1o Help or Endogenous Help treatments.  3ayoffs for both types in the final block are 
also significantly higher in the )orced Commitment treatment than in the Endogenous Help treatment.  
)or low ability types, payoffs in both blocks are also significantly higher than in the 1o Help treatment.  
As should be expected since help is costly, the difference in high ability payoffs between the Endogenous 
Help with Commitment and 1o Help treatments is never statistically significant. 
Conclusion 3:  The Forced Commitment treatment has a large persistent effect on effort.  Compared with 
the No Help treatment, Forced Commitment makes low ability types better off without harming the high 
ability types.  The data supports Hypothesis 2. 
 
The positive effect of )orced Commitment is probably not due to an increase in the level of help 
offered, as the average level of help over rounds 11  30 is higher in the )orced Commitment treatment 
than in the Endogenous Help treatment 1.40 vs. 1.21 but not dramatically so.19  As in the Endogenous 
Help treatment, high ability types in the )orced Commitment treatment often cut help for successfully 
coordinated firms ± of twelve firms coordinated at 40 in 5ound 20, four cut help for the second block.  
The difference between the Endogenous Help and )orced Commitment treatments is that forced 
commitment gives time for groups to strongly converge to a new equilibrium in the first block with help 
5ounds 11 ± 20.  In the groups where play was coordinated at 40 in 5ound 20 and help decreased for 
the final block, all four employees had been choosing 40 since at least 5ound 14.  These groups had a 
                                                          
1 )or high ability types, average payoffs over 5ounds 21 ± 30 are 4 EC8s, 31 EC8s, 3 EC8s, and 4 EC8s 
in the 1o Help, 6ymmetric Costs, Endogenous Help, and )orced Commitment treatments.  Analogous figures for 
low ability types are 2 EC8s, 33 EC8s, 302 EC8s, and 3 EC8s. 
19 5unning a ttest on the average help provided low ability types, the difference is not statistically significant at 
even the 10 level 59 obs t   0.9 p   .33. 
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firmly established norm of coordinating on the efficient outcome.  Two of the groups saw a brief decrease 
in 5ound 21, in both cases due to a change by a single employee, but every employee in these four groups 
chose effort level 40 in 5ounds 22 ± 30.  Increasing help for the final block leads to increased minimum 
effort, but, unlike the Endogenous Help treatment, a decrease in help in the Forced Commitment 
treatment does not cause a decrease in effort by low ability types.  )or the seven groups where help 
decreased, the average minimum effort increased slightly between blocks 23. for 5ounds 11  20 vs. 24 
for 5ounds 21  30.  In the five groups where help increased for 5ounds 21 ± 30, the average minimum 
effort increased strongly between the two blocks from 5.2 to 25..  With forced commitment, changes in 
help push effort up rather than down.  We conMecture that forcing commitment gives the time for strong 
convergence to the efficient equilibrium to occur before the high ability types can disrupt things by 
cutting help, a conMecture formally examined by the model contained in 6ection .  
 
 An StrXctXral Model of %eKaYior in Experiment  
We now introduce a structural model designed to explore the causes of the two key observations 
from Experiment 1 1 )orced Commitment leads to an increase in minimum effort relative to 1o Help 
and Endogenous Help and 2 high ability types in the Endogenous Help treatment cut help prematurely, 
undermining the positive effects of having provided help.  We develop a model that reproduces these 
features.  In 6ection 5 we conMectured that overoptimism by high ability types plays an important role in 
generating these regularities by encouraging high ability types to abandon help prematurely.  *oing 
beyond intuition, the fitting exercise directly tests whether allowing for overoptimism significant 
improves the model¶s fit to the data and improves its ability to track differences between the treatments.  
5eciprocity could also play a role in driving the dynamics, a proposition tested through the fitting 
exercise. 
Model Specification: Our basic model is a simplified version of the sophisticated EWA model of 
Camerer, Ho, and Chong 2002.  The technical details are given in Appendix C.  The model includes two 
types of individuals, unsophisticated and sophisticated learners.  Individuals are randomly assigned types 
with the probability of being a sophisticated type given by the parameter Į.  1ote that both high and low 
ability types are equally likely to be sophisticated learners, as the ability type high or low is assigned 
exogenously by the experimenter while the individuals learning type sophisticated or unsophisticated is 
an exogenous characteristic of the individual subMect. 
8nsophisticated players follow a simple adaptive learning rule closely related to Cournot 
learning.  The choice of Cournot learning rather than a more flexible learning rule like noisy fictitious 
play, reinforcement learning, or EWA is driven by the structure of information in the experiment.  
6ophisticated learners have to be able to model the learning of unsophisticated types.  In our experiment, 
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 1
subMects can observe the choices of the other three individuals in their group, but not in a way that is 
identifiable.  This means that it is impossible to track an individual¶s choices across periods.20  Modeling 
Cournot learning by others does not require this information, but models like noisy fictitious play, 
reinforcement learning, and EWA require the ability to track individuals across periods.  We therefore use 
a model that does not require sophisticated types to use information they don¶t possess. 
There are two types of unsophisticated learners which vary only in their initial beliefs about 
others¶ behavior.  Optimists initially believe that all other players will choose 40, the highest possible 
effort level, while pessimists initially believe that all other players will choose 0.21 The initial beliefs of an 
unsophisticated type are randomly drawn, with parameter ș giving the probability of a pessimist.  After 
each decision round, unsophisticated players update their beliefs, with the new beliefs being a weighted 
average of the other group members¶ effort levels in the previous round and initial beliefs given by 1.   
        it it u1q m t m 1 t q m  for u  ^optimist, pessemist` and  m   Z K  Z      
6pecifically, an unsophisticated player¶s beliefs qitm give weights for each possible minimum 
effort m ∈	ሼ0,	10,	20,	30,	40ሽ	for	the	other	three	players.  The weight on the previous round¶s outcome 
is given by Ȧt.  This weight changes over time according to 2, where Ȗ is a parameter fit from the data, 
Ȧ1   0, and Ȧ2   ഥ߱   ഥ߱	is also a parameter fit from the data.  The function Șitm gives the weight on 
minimum effort m if the probability of each effort level is given by the observed frequency in the 
preceding period22 and qu1m is the initial weight on minimum effort m subMect to the individual¶s type 
optimist or pessimist.  The model allows for a reset of beliefs in 5ound 11 to account for the underlying 
game changing when the bonus rate is increased and, possibly, help is allowed.  This is captured by 
subtracting the parameter ȡ from Ȧ10, which puts less weight on experience from 5ound 10 and more 
weight on initial beliefs.  
Ȧt   Ȧt í 1  Ȗ if t  3   
%ased on these beliefs, expected payoffs can be generated for each of the five available effort 
levels.  These are transformed into ³attractions´ by adding extra weight to the effort level that was chosen 
                                                          
20 )or example, suppose in two consecutive periods, the effort choices by the other three players in my group are 40, 
20, 30 followed by 20, 40, 30.  My feedback displays choices ordered from highest to lowest without IDs.  6o in 
both periods I receive feedback showing 40 30 20.  I have no way of knowing whether individuals have changed 
their effort levels between periods or not. 
21 Adding these types helps the model capture the bimodal distribution of behaviour in the data.  Adding more types 
or more sophisticated versions of heterogeneous initial beliefs complicates the model, making it more difficult to 
fit, without improving its ability to track the experimental data. 
22 )or example, suppose the other three group members chose 0, 20, and 40 in the preceding period.  
8nsophisticated types then assign a probability of 13 to each of these three effort levels.  A probability distribution 
over the others¶ minimum effort is generated by assuming that each of the other three individual group member¶s 
effort levels is independently drawn with equal probability over 0, 20, and 40. 
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in the previous period, where the extra weight is given by a parameter į multiplied by the number of 
times the same choice has been repeated.  3utting extra weight on repeated choices allows the model to 
capture the fairly obvious hysteresis in the data.  Earlier papers have found that incorporating hysteresis 
into a learning model significantly improved the fit i.e. Cooper and 6tockman, 2002 Camerer, Ho, and 
Chong, 2002 Wilcox, 200.   
The choice of an unsophisticated type is generated from beliefs using a logit decision rule, with 
the parameter Ȝ determining the level of noise.  In the Endogenous Help and )orced Commitment 
treatments, we also have to model help decisions by unsophisticated high ability types.  This is done in a 
manner that parallels the choice of effort levels described above, although a separate noise parameter, ȜH, 
is estimated for the choice of help. 
6ophisticated types anticipate the learning of unsophisticated types and are forward looking, 
engaging in strategic teaching. They understand that their current actions affect the beliefs of 
unsophisticated players in the subsequent round. This makes help attractive as a tool for pushing 
unsophisticated types toward higher effort levels.   
*oing into details, sophisticated types assume that all of the other group members are 
unsophisticated types.  This departs from the sophisticated EWA model in which sophisticated types 
place positive weight on other players also being sophisticated types.  Our model therefore does not nest 
45E and is more in the spirit of a levelk model.  If sophisticated types believe that others may also be 
sophisticated, it becomes necessary to calculate a fixed point as part of fitting the model, greatly 
increasing the computational complexity of the exercise.  *iven that our model does a good Mob of 
tracking the data and gives useful insights into the underlying processes, we opt for the simpler model. 
6ophisticated types have all the information necessary to calculate beliefs and attractions for the 
other three members of their group assuming the others are unsophisticated.  Applying the relevant logit 
decision rule, they can generate a distribution over choices and minimum efforts for the other three group 
members.  These serve as a sophisticated type¶s beliefs about current actions.  6ophisticated types also 
have all the information needed generate a probability distribution over the beliefs of unsophisticated 
types in the upcoming period, and by extension to generate a distribution over the future choices of others 
as a function of their own current choice.  
%ased on their beliefs about current and future actions by the other three players, sophisticated 
types calculate expected current and future payoffs as a function of their current actions effort and, if a 
high ability type, help.  Choices are reached via a logit decision rule where attractions are given by the 
sum of expected payoffs for the current and upcoming periods.23 
                                                          
23 To simplify the model, equal weight is put on current and future expected payoffs and the noise parameter is 
assumed to be the same for sophisticated and unsophisticated types. 
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%ased on specific features of our data, described above, we added two features to the basic model.   
1 Overoptimism The basic model assumes sophisticated types have a correctly specified model of 
how unsophisticated types form beliefs and then make choices.  We depart from this assumption by 
allowing for ³overoptimism´ by sophisticated types.  6ophisticated types may believe that 
unsophisticated types learn faster from experience are more responsive to new information than is the 
case in reality, and therefore may be overly optimistic about their ability to affect the beliefs of 
unsophisticated types.  This is incorporated into the model by allowing the possibility that sophisticated 
types overestimate the weight that unsophisticated players give to observed past behavior vs. their initial 
beliefs.  6pecifically, sophisticated types calculating the beliefs of unsophisticated types replace Ȧt with 
Ȧt  ȝ, where ȝ is an overoptimism parameter fit from the data. 
2 5eciprocity  5eciprocity is an important feature of many environments and it seems plausible 
that it could play a role here as well.  When a high ability type increases the level of help, she weakly 
helps the low ability types and harms herself.  Likewise, decreasing help weakly harms the low ability 
types and helps the high ability type.  The preceding implies that increasing help can be seen as a kind 
action by the high ability type while decreasing help can be seen as unkind.  If the preferences of low 
ability types incorporate reciprocity, they should want to reward the high ability type following an 
increase in help and punish them after a decrease.  This can be done within a weak link game via changes 
in their effort levels since, in a weaklink game with stochastic choice, the expected payoffs of the other 
players are a strictly increasing function of my own effort.   )rom a dynamic point of view, reciprocity 
can affect the model¶s predictions because it accentuates responses to changing levels of help. We 
therefore wanted to test for the presence of reciprocity and determine if the addition of reciprocity to the 
model would improve its ability to capture the main features of Experiment 1. 
To incorporate reciprocity into our model, we allow the attractions for a low ability type, as a 
function of the low ability type
s effort, to include weights on the expected payoff of the high ability type. 
3ositive weight is put on the high ability type¶s expected payoff if he has been kind by increasing the 
amount of help provided.  The amount of weight put on the high ability type¶s expected payoff in these 
circumstances is given by the parameter ț which is fit from the data.24  This is a simple and intuitive way 
of adding reciprocity to the model, similar to the way reciprocity is added to the Charness and 5abin 
2002 model, and has a natural effect on the choices of low ability types.  Low ability types try to help 
harm high ability types who have helped harmed them by choosing a higher lower effort than they 
                                                          
24 )or simplicity we assume that this weight is equal for positive and negative reciprocity.  We doubt these weights 
are truly equal given experimental results to the contrary i.e. Offerman, 2002 but allowing for greater weight on 
negative reciprocity would not affect the intuition underlying our results. 
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would otherwise select.  5eciprocity is applied to attractions for both unsophisticated and sophisticated 
low ability types. 
Model Results: The full model¶s parameters were fit to data from the three treatments of interest, 1o 
Help, Endogenous Help, and )orced Commitment, using the simulated method of moments.  6ee 
Appendix C for details on how the model was fit to the data, but fitting the model roughly involves the 
following.  6tarting with a given set of parameters, we simulate the model for 1000 groups in all three 
treatments.  )or each period in each treatment, we calculate the difference between the observed average 
minimum effort and the simulated average minimum effort.  6quaring these differences and then taking 
the sum across periods and treatments gives us our measure of fit.  The parameters are adMusted to 
minimize the sum of squared differences.  In other words, we are picking the parameters that most closely 
track the observed minimum effort averaging across periods and treatments.  The estimated parameters 
and standard errors in parenthesis are presented in Table 5 below. All of the parameters are significantly 
different from zero, except for Ȗ, the time trend for the weight unsophisticated types¶ beliefs put on their 
most recent experience, and, surprisingly, the reciprocity parameter ț.  We estimate that a high proportion 
5. of subMects are sophisticated types.  The estimated fraction of pessimistic unsophisticated types is 
quite low, 0.09, so most unsophisticated types are optimists. )inally, the overoptimism parameter is 
significant and positive.  6ophisticated types believe that unsophisticated types are putting significantly 
more weight about 23 more on their most recent experience than is actually the case. 
>Table 5 around here@ 
 8sing the parameters that best fit the data, we look at simulated data for each of the three 
treatments.  )igure 4 compares the average minimum efforts in the experimental top left panel and 
simulated top right panel data.  The simulated data reproduces the two main regularities of the 
experimental data  )orced Commitment leads to an increase in minimum effort relative to 1o Help, and 
but Endogenous Help does not.    
>)igure 4 around here@ 
It is not true that any learning model fit to the data would reproduce the main features of the data.  
A model¶s goodness of fit is being measured by the squared sum of differences between simulated and 
observed minimum efforts averaging across periods and treatments.  A model that fits well on average 
can still fail to track the data from any one treatment or differences across treatments.  This point is 
illustrated by three alternative models to the data.  The first only includes unsophisticated learners.  
Mathematically, we impose a constraint that Į   0, where Į is the fraction of sophisticated types.  The 
second is the basic model with unsophisticated and sophisticated learners but no overoptimism or 
reciprocity.  Here the constraints on the full model are ȝ   0 and ț   0, where ȝ and ț are the parameters 
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governing the strength of overoptimism and reciprocity respectively.  The third adds reciprocity, but not 
overoptimism, to the main model.  The sole constraint imposed in this case is ȝ   0.  The middle left 
panel of )igure 4 shows simulation results for the model with only unsophisticated learners and the 
middle right panel shows simulations for the basic model.  In both cases, even though the models¶ 
parameters are chosen to best fit the data, there is no discernable difference between the three 
treatments.25  The model with reciprocity but no overoptimism lower left panel does only slightly 
better, with only tiny differences between the treatments.  
 1ot only does reciprocity receive little weight in the fitted version of the full model, but 
artificially adding reciprocity to the model harms its ability to track differences between treatments.  To 
show this, we fit a model constrained to have a higher level of reciprocity ț  1 than the low fitted value 
ț   .012.  6imulated data for this model is shown in the lower right panel of )igure 4.  It correctly has 
average minimum effort higher in )orced Commitment than 1o Help, but has equally high average 
minimum effort for Endogenous Commitment.  In the experimental data, the average minimum effort for 
Endogenous Commitment is significantly lower than in )orced Commitment. 
 To understand why sophistication and overoptimism receive significant weight in the fitted 
version of the full model but reciprocity is not, consider how changing the learning model affects use of 
help.  8nsophisticated learners treat their group members as a fixed statistical distribution, failing to 
recognize that changes in incentives will change their behavior.  6ince high ability types only benefit 
from help if it affects the behavior of low ability types, unsophisticated learners do not anticipate any 
benefits from help.  9irtually no help is provided in the fitted model with only unsophisticated types  
only 0.2 of the high ability types ever use help in simulations of the Endogenous Help treatment.  *iven 
that help doesn¶t get used, it follows that changing how help can be used won¶t matter.  This leads to the 
lack of differences between treatments shown in the middleleft panel of )igure 4. 
In the basic model i.e. no reciprocity or overoptimism help still gets almost no use.  In the 
simulations, only 0.5 of the high ability types ever use help in the Endogenous Help treatment.  Once 
again, it follows that changing how help can be used will be irrelevant.   Adding overoptimism gets two 
important features.  High ability types think low ability types will respond more to the provision of help 
than they actually do, making them more willing to use help.  The percentage of high ability types who 
use help at least once in simulations of the Endogenous Help treatment rises to 5 in the full model.    
%ut, because they overestimate how much they have affected low ability types¶ beliefs after providing 
help, overoptimistic high ability types are too willing to abandon help.  6witches in help are almost 
evenly split between increases and decreases high ability types average 0.1 increases and 0.5 
                                                          
25 It may not appear that there are three lines in these two panels, but this is because they are on top of each other. 
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decreases as high ability types who adopt help tend to rapidly abandon it, undercutting its positive effect.  
With )orced Commitment, the high ability types can no longer abandon help, allowing minimum effort to 
converge to higher levels in simulation of the full model.  The mechanism underlying the differences 
between treatments in simulations of the full model is similar to the mechanism in the experimental data.    
8se of help also explains reciprocity plays little role in the ability of the model to track the 
experimental data.  Like overoptimism, reciprocity makes help more attractive since the positive 
response to increasing help is larger.  In the model with artificially high reciprocity ț  1 the percentage 
of high ability types who use help at least once in simulations of the Endogenous Help treatment is still 
relatively high at 3.5.  However, reciprocity also accentuates the negative response of low ability types 
to a decrease in help.  6ince sophisticated learners model the decision process of other players and 
therefore anticipate this effect, reciprocity makes decreasing help less attractive.  In the model with 
artificially high reciprocity there are far fewer decreases than increases an average of 1.34 increases 
versus 0.52 decreases.  5eciprocity gets little weight in the full model because it undermines a critical 
feature, premature decreases of help.  It is worth noting that other modifications to the model that 
accentuate the negative response to decreased help, such as adding inequality aversion to the utility 
function, would likewise fail to improve the model¶s performance. 
A pair of observations, one about the data and one about the simulations, makes it less surprising 
that the full model puts little weight on reciprocity.  The strong negative reaction to reductions in help in 
Endogenous Help was an important piece of evidence for reciprocity, but this reaction is not present in the 
)orced Commitment treatment.  In groups where help is reduced prior to 5ound 21, the mean and 
median change in effort by low ability types between 5ounds 20 and 21 is 0.  *iven that reducing help 
for the final ten periods is an irreversible action that harms the low ability types, reciprocity should be 
highly relevant in this particular case.  The data from )orced Commitment is more consistent with groups 
having converged to equilibrium and hence not being destabilized by reduced help than reciprocity.   
 In the experimental data from the Endogenous Help treatment we documented an asymmetric 
response of minimum effort by the low ability types to changes in the level of help see )igure 3 and 
accompanying text.  *enerating asymmetric responses to changes of help does not require reciprocity.  
In simulations of the full model, where reciprocity is largely absent in the fitted parameters, the minimum 
effort of the three low ability types increases by an average of 4.54 in response to an increase in the help 
level and falls by an average of 10.00 in response to a decrease in the help level.   
We do not claim that the structural model presented above perfectly tracks the experimental data 
or provides the best possible fit.  We have simplified the model in many ways to make it easier to 
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implement, and a more complex model could no doubt improve the fit.2  Indeed, in future work we plan 
to explore ways the model can be improved as well as experimental tests of the learning model.   
To summarize, we learn three important things from fitting the learning model.  1  A relatively 
simple structural model is able to track the most important features of the data from Experiment 1 adding 
help does not increase minimum effort when high ability types are free to adMust help in Endogenous 
Help, but does yield an increase when they are forced to commit in )orced Commitment.   2  It is not 
true that any learning model fit to the data would track these features.  Models without sophisticated 
learners or with sophisticated learners but lacking overoptimism cannot reproduce the relative effects of 
Endogenous Help and )orced Commitment.2  3  Adding reciprocity to the model, either alone or 
coupled with overoptimism, does not help the model¶s ability to explain the main treatment effects.  This 
stems from the interaction between reciprocity and sophistication reciprocity makes high ability types 
who are sophisticated learners less willing to help since they correctly anticipate a strong negative 
response.   
Conclusion 4:  A model containing unsophisticated learners and sophisticated learners with over-
optimism captures key regularities of the experimental data.  Over-optimism is necessary to capture the 
main features of the data, but adding reciprocity to the model is not necessary 
 
 Experiment : 'irect Help  
  In this section we model help as being direct rather than indirect high ability types provide help 
by doing some of the work of low ability types. The new treatments parallel the Endogenous Help and 
Endogenous Help with Commitment treatments.  A low bonus rate %    is used in 5ounds 1 ± 10 to 
trap groups at low effort levels, and then raised to %   14 for 5ounds 11 ± 30.  High ability types can help 
low ability types in 5ounds 11 ± 30 by choosing a level of help before the four workers make effort 
choices.  The difference between Experiments 1 and 2 is how help is provided.  In addition to working on 
his own task up to a maximum of 40 hours, the high ability type can also allocate time in 10 hour units 
to the low ability types¶ tasks.  To keep help efficiency neutral, the effort cost of a high ability type doing 
the work of a low ability type is the same 9 EC8hr as it would be for a low ability type.  Intuitively, we 
model costs as reflecting the difficulty of the tasks rather than the ability of the workers, but high ability 
types can work more hours than low ability types.2  The same amount of help must be given to each low 
                                                          
2 Alternatives we are exploring include making sophisticated types better at predicting the future, using more data 
from past periods, and changing the specification to capture hysteresis. 
2 The importance of sophisticated learners adds to existing evidence notably Camerer, Ho, and Chong, 2002 of the 
importance of sophisticated learners in tracking experimental data. 
2 To keep the basic structure of the game fixed, we let the high ability type work more than 40 hours but restricted 
the amount he could work on his own task.  
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ability type.  When help is provided, the ³effective´ number of hours provided by a low ability worker is 
the sum of the hours received as help plus the hours worked directly by the low ability worker.  
 Table  shows the payoff tables for high and low ability types if one unit 10 hours of help is 
provided.29  In the payoff table for high ability types left panel, the minimum effort level by other 
employees goes from 10 to 50 instead of 0 to 40, since the high ability type has provided 10 hours of 
work to each of the low ability types. 6imilarly, in the payoff table for low ability types right panel the 
effective hours provided by a worker go from 10 to 50 reflecting the 10 hours of help.  The minimum 
effective effort by other employees can still be zero since the high ability worker has the perverse option 
to not work at his own Mob. 
>Table  around here@ 
 Coordinating at effective effort levels 10, 20, 30, and 40 are 1ash equilibria of the subgame 
shown in Table .  There are four equilibria rather than five as previously, but the equilibria remain 3areto 
ranked, the efficient equilibrium remains 40, and the basic properties of a weak link game are preserved.   
 The two treatments with direct help, Direct Help and Direct Help with )orced Commitment, 
parallel the Endogenous Help and )orced Commitment treatments in Experiment 1. The mechanism 
through which forced commitment is expected to have a positive effect on average minimum effort is the 
same as for indirect help. )orced commitment prevents overoptimistic high ability low effort cost types 
from decreasing help before the equilibration process has finished.  1ote that the 1o Help treatment from 
Experiment 1 continues to serve as the baseline. 
H4: In the long run, average minimum effort will be higher in Direct Help than in the No Help treatment 
and in Direct Help with Forced Commitment than in Direct Help. 
 We ran  additional sessions with 13 subMects participating in the additional two treatments 5 
subMects in Direct Help and 0 in Direct Help with )orced Commitment. *eneral procedures were 
identical to the ones described for Experiment 1 and subMects made an average of ¼19.04. 
)igure 5 shows the average minimum effort for the two direct help treatments as well as the 1o 
Help treatment from Experiment 1.  1ote that this is effective minimum effort which includes any help 
provided by the high ability type as part of the effort for each low ability type.  Compared to the 1o Help 
treatment, the effect of the Direct Help treatment is dramatic and negative.  There is a slight increase 
between 5ounds 10 and 11, but average minimum effort stabilizes below 5.  The addition of commitment 
once improves performance as average minimum effort in the Direct Help with )orced Commitment 
                                                          
29 6ubMects were allowed to provide more units of help, but this is sufficiently expensive that we did not anticipate 
higher levels of help being used.  On rare occasions we observed provision of two units of help. 
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treatment rapidly stabilizes in the neighborhood of 20.  Adding forced commitment to direct help 
overcomes the miserable performance without commitment but does not lead to an overall improvement. 
>)igure 5 around here@ 
5egression analysis described in Appendix % confirms the obvious.  Compared with the 1o Help 
treatment, Direct Help leads to a statistically significant decrease in effective minimum effort.  Direct 
Help with )orced Commitment has no significant effect relative to 1o Help but significantly improves 
effective minimum effort relative to the Direct Help treatment. 
The extraordinarily low minimum effort levels in Direct Help are explained in part by factors 
similar to those responsible for weak performance in the Endogenous Help treatment from Experiment 1.  
A maMority of the high ability types  of 14 try offering help at least once, and offering help leads to 
improved performance.  )ollowing an increase in help, the average effective minimum help increases by 
an average of 14.0.  The problem is that the lack of commitment by high ability types is extreme.  In 1 of 
the 23 cases where help is increased, the increase is reversed in the following round.  There is no case of 
help being offered for more than three consecutive rounds.  )or every single case where help is decreased, 
the minimum effort immediately returns to 0.  The inability of high ability types in the Direct Help 
treatment to stick with help undoes any positive effects of the initial increases.  Average effective 
minimum effort is actually slightly higher in the groups where help is never offered 4.2 than in groups 
where help is offered at least once 3.0. 
Cutting help does not cause effective minimum effort to collapse in Direct Help with 
Commitment.  In this treatment, 12 of the 20 high ability types offer positive levels of help in 5ound 11.  
)or 5ounds 1 ± 20, average minimum effective help for these twelve groups is 23. as compared to .5 
when no help is provided.  Help is eliminated in ten of the twelve groups for 5ounds 21 ± 30.  The 
response is negative but small.  Minimum effort falls for six of the ten groups in 5ound 21, but only two 
collapse to a minimum effort of zero.  Comparing the average effective minimum efforts for 5ounds 1 ± 
20 and 5ounds 2 ± 30, there is only a slight decrease from 22. to 1. for these ten groups.  As with 
indirect help, forced commitment with direct help allows groups time to converge to equilibrium so that a 
later reduction in help is less disruptive. 
Conclusion 4:  The effect of Direct Help is strongly negative, reducing minimum effort to almost the 
lowest possible level.  Forced commitment reverses this effect, but does not lead to minimum effort levels 
above the No Help treatment. 
 
 )inal remarNs 
The purpose of this paper is to study whether high ability employees can use help as an effective 
tool for leading groups out of performance traps.  Help turns out to be a doubleedged sword that can 
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harm as much as it helps.  Increasing help leads to improved performance, but prematurely decreasing 
help in an effort to take profits undoes any positive effects from the initial provision of help.  )orcing 
high ability types to commit to a stable level of help over time consistently improves the effect of help on 
groups¶ performance in the turnaround game.  A relatively simple structural model shows that the 
importance of commitment can be attributed to overoptimism, the belief by sophisticated types that 
learning by unsophisticated types is faster than is actually the case. 
 Our work suggests that it is not sufficient for managers to encourage help among workers for 
example by forming work teams as in Hamilton et al. 2003.  Management must also encourage stability 
in how help is provided.  This need not be overly complicated.  6imply holding a meeting on a monthly 
basis where employees discuss what they will do for the upcoming month, including what help they will 
provide others, may serve as a useful device for fostering more stable commitments to help.  .eeping 
work groups together for an extended period of time rather than rematching workers may also have the 
effect of creating a more stable environment where levels of help are more likely to be steady. 
 Our work does not address endogenous commitment to help.  It would be useful to know if high 
ability types would take advantage of a commitment device if one was offered but not required.  We 
believe that they would not ± if subMects understood the value of commitment, they probably wouldn¶t be 
undercutting successful coordination in the first place ± but the question is ultimately an empirical one. 
 )inally, there is a broader point to be taken away from our work.  This paper focuses on the 
effectiveness of help in escaping performance traps, but the importance of commitment is likely to be a 
more general phenomenon.  Escaping a performance trap is Must one of many cases where leaders might 
seek to overturn an existing norm in favor of a more socially desirable one, and help is Must one of a 
multitude of tools available to potential leaders.  Establishing a new more desirable norm is a gradual 
process, and one that can be disrupted by negative changes along many dimensions.  As described in the 
introduction, the same insights that this paper generates about excessive switching of help by high ability 
workers also seem to apply to excessive switching of bonus rates by managers acting as leaders.  We 
imagine there are many examples where a selfdefeating tendency to declare victory and cease costly 
attempts at leadership undercuts the benefits of leadership.  If our basic insights generalize, a good 
strategy for individuals to follow in attempting to establish a new socially desirable norm is to pick an 
approach and stick with it.  If effective leadership shares a common element of strategic teaching, even 
the best of approaches will fail if used inconsistently. 
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A33E1',; A 
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I N S T R U C TIONS 
The purpose of this experiment is to study how individuals make decisions in certain contexts. The instructions are simple and if 
you follow them carefully you will at the end of the sessions confidentially obtain a sum of money in cash, given that nobody will 
know the payments received by any of the other participants. <ou can ask us at any time any questions you may have by raising 
your hand. Apart from these questions, any kind of communication between you is prohibited and may lead to immediate 
exclusion from the experiment. 
1. )or participating in this experiment you obtain an initial payment of 2500 EC8s a virtual money unit. 
This experiment consists of various blocks of 10 rounds each.. The conditions of the experiment are 
identical within each block and although some of the conditions can vary between on block and the next, 
you will at each point informed about whatever changes are introduced. In each round you are part of the 
same group of 4 participants. The composition of these groups which are called firms will not vary during 
the experiment. *iven that nobody will know the identity of the members of each group, all the actions you 
take during the experiment will be absolutely anonymous. 
2. As as worker of your firm you have to decide how to split your working week of 40 working hours between 
two activities Activity A and Activity %. *iven that the hours that you don¶t assign to one of the activities 
is automatically assigned to the other we will Must ask you that you decide how many weekly hours you 
spend on Activity A. *iven that the available options are to spend 0, 10, 20, 30 or 40 hours on Activity A, 
this automatically implies spending 40, 30, 20, 10 or 0 on Activity % respectively. 
3. In each round you will receive a base salary of 200 EC8s. <our payoff will depend on this base salary, on 
your decisions and on a bonus that depends on the minimum number of hours spend on Activity A by any 
of the members of your group. This bonus is chosen by the central server of the lab, which simulates the 
decisions of the firm¶s management. %efore making any decision, you will receive information about the 
value of this bonus. 
4. <our earnings in each round depend on the hours you spend on Activity A, on the number of hours by the 
other workers in your firm on Activity A, on the bonus B selected by management and on Ce a variable that 
represents your cost of effort at work. <our earnings are given by the following formula 
Base salary - Effort  + Bonus 
Earnings of worker =  200   - (Ce × Hi ) + (B × min(HA)) 
where Hi is the number of hours that you spend on Activity A and minHA is the minimum number of 
hours that a worker of your firm spends on Activity A. <ou don¶t need to memorize this formula the 
computer will show you an earnings table whenever you have to make a decision. 
5. In each firm there are two types of workers 1 worker of type 1 and 3 workers of type 2. At the beginning 
of the session you will be informed of what type of worker during the whole experiment, since types will 
not vary. The two types of workers will differ exclusively in their initial effort cost Ce, which is higher in 
on the types relative to the other type. During the first 10 rounds 
a. Workers of type 1 have an effort cost of Ce   1 and their earnings are calculated according to the 
following formula 
Earnings of type 1 = 200 − 1 × Hi + B × min(HA) 
b. Workers of type 2 have an effort cost of Ce   9 and their earnings are calculated according to the 
following formula 
Earnings of type 2 = 200 − 9 × Hi + B × min(HA) 
. Although none of the participants will receive earnings as manager of the firm, you will be shown 
information about its earnings, which depend on the hours spent on Activity A by the workers of the firms 
and on the bonus B, as shown in the following formula which again you don¶t need to memorize 
     )irm profit   100  52 í 4 î % î minHA 
 
. In each round, the computer will show you a table similar to those that are shown below. The payoffs that 
are shown adMust to the variable values of B. In the examples that follow we use B   . 1ote that this 
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information is shown in the upper part of the payoff table. )or players of type  with an effort cost equal to 
1 the payoff table is the following  
    %    
    )irm profit   100   20 î minHA 
    
MinimXm of KoXrs spent on ActiYity A by tKe otKer worNers 
    
    0 10 20 30 40 
My KoXrs spent 
on ActiYity A 
 0  200 200 200 200 200 
 10  190 20 20 20 20 
 20  10 20 340 340 340 
 30  10 250 330 410 410 
 40  10 240 320 400 40 
 
)or players of type , with an effort cost equal to 9, the payoff table is 
    %    
    )irm profit   100   20 î minHA 
    
MinimXm of KoXrs spent on ActiYity A by tKe otKer worNers 
    
    0 10 20 30 40 
My KoXrs spent 
on ActiYity A 
 0  200 200 200 200 200 
 10  110 190 190 190 190 
 20  20 100 10 10 10 
 30  0 10 90 10 10 
 40  10 0 0 0 10 
 
. Each worker chooses the number of hours spent on Activity A using the buttons located on the right side of 
the screen. <ou can change your choice as often as you want, but once you click ³O.´ this decision is 
irreversible. 
9. When you make your choice you will not know what the other workers of your firm hve done, but, after 
each round you will be informed of the number of hours that the workers of your firm have spent on 
Activity, the profit of your firm, your earnings in that round and your accumulated earnings. <ou will also 
be able to see a summary of results from previous rounds. 
10. At the end of the experiment, your accumulate earnings will  be converted from EC8s to euros at an 
exchange rate of 500 EC8s   ¼1. 
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Example 
%efore starting the experiment, please go over the following questions. )or each of the questions assume that %    
and that you are a worker of type 1 with an effort cost of 1. 
8sing your earnings table shown on the previous page suppose that you choose spending 10 hours on Activity A and 
that the other workers of your firm decide to spend 30, 20 and 40 hours on Activity A. 
In this case 
The minimum number of hours that a worker of your firm spends on Activity A is 10. 
<our earnings are 20 EC8s. 
 
1ow consider that you are a worker of type 2 with an effort cost equal to 9. The relevant earnings table would be the 
second on the previous page. 6uppose that you choose to spend 20 hours on Activity A and that the other workers of 
your firm spend 30, 20 and 40 hours on Activity A. 
 
In this case 
The minimum number of hours that a worker of your firm spends on Activity A is 20. 
<our earnings are 10 EC8s. 
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A little test 
Imagine that you are a worker of type 1 effort cost   1. 8sing your earnings table suppose that you choose to 
spend 20 hours on Activity A. The other workers of your firm choose to spend 30, 0 and 20 hours on Activity A. 
The minimum number of hours that a worker of my firm spends on A is BBBBB. 
My earnings in EC8s are BBBBB. 
 
6uppose you decide to spend 0 hours on Activity A. The other workers of your firm choose to spend 20, 30 and 10 
hours on Activity A. 
The minimum number of hours that a worker of my firm spends on A is BBBBB. 
My earnings in EC8s are BBBBB. 
 
I will be in the same firm during the whole experiment Ƒ True.  Ƒ )alse. 
My actions and earnings will be confidential    Ƒ True.  Ƒ )alse. 
 
Imagine that you are a worker of type 2 effort cost   9. 8sing your earnings table suppose that you choose to 
spend 20 hours on Activity A. The other workers of your firm choose to spend 30, 0 and 20 hours on Activity A. 
The minimum number of hours that a worker of my firm spends on A is BBBBB. 
My earnings in EC8s are BBBBB. 
 
6uppose you decide to spend 0 hours on Activity A. The other workers of your firm choose to spend 20, 30 and 10 
hours on Activity A. 
The minimum number of hours that a worker of my firm spends on A is BBBBB. 
My earnings in EC8s are BBBBB. 
 
I will be in the same firm during the whole experiment Ƒ True.  Ƒ )alse. 
My actions and earnings will be confidential    Ƒ True.  Ƒ )alse. 
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)rom this round on there are two changes in the experiment i the value of the bonus becomes 14 and ii the 
worker of type 1 in each group has the possibility of reducing the effort costs of the workers of type 2 of his 
group by increasing his own effort cost. The type 1 worker will make this decision before the effort decisions 
for the round are made. )or each unit by which he reduces the effort costs of the three workers of type 2, the 
effort cost of the type 1 worker will increase by 3 units. The reduction will have to be the same for all workers 
of type 2 in the group, so that the concrete options available to the type 1 worker will be the following 
 
 Effort cost for type 1 Effort cost for type 2 
Help level 0 1 9 
Help level 1 4  
Help level 2   
Help level 3 10  
Help level 4 13 5 
 
The possibilities of modifying the effort costs lead to different payoff tables. *iven that the possible effort costs 
are 1, 4, 5, , , , 9, 10 and 13 below we show the payoff tables for each of the possible effort costs 
 
 
  Ce   1 
  %   14 
  )irm profit   100   4 î minHA 
  MinimXm of KoXrs spent on ActiYity A by tKe otKer worNers 
  0 10 20 30 40 
  0 200 200 200 200 200 
My KoXrs spent  10 190 330 330 330 330 
 on ActiYity A 20 10 320 40 40 40 
  30 10 310 450 590 590 
  40 10 300 440 50 20 
 
  Ce   4 
  %   14 
  )irm profit   100   4 î minHA 
  MinimXm of KoXrs spent on ActiYity A by tKe otKer worNers 
  0 10 20 30 40 
  0 200 200 200 200 200 
My KoXrs spent 10 10 300 300 300 300 
on ActiYity A 20 120 20 400 400 400 
  30 0 220 30 500 500 
  40 40 10 320 40 00 
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  Ce   5 
  %   14 
  )irm profit   100   4 î minHA 
  MinimXm of KoXrs spent on ActiYity A by tKe otKer worNers 
  0 10 20 30 40 
  0 200 200 200 200 200 
My KoXrs spent 10 150 290 290 290 290 
on ActiYity A 20 100 240 30 30 30 
  30 50 190 330 40 40 
  40 0 140 20 420 50 
 
  Ce    
  %   14 
  )irm profit   100   4 î minHA 
  MinimXm of KoXrs spent on ActiYity A by tKe otKer worNers 
  0 10 20 30 40 
  0 200 200 200 200 200 
My KoXrs spent 10 140 20 20 20 20 
on ActiYity A 20 0 220 30 30 30 
  30 20 10 300 440 440 
  40 40 100 240 30 520 
 
 
  Ce    
  %   14 
  )irm profit   100   4 î minHA 
  MinimXm of KoXrs spent on ActiYity A by tKe otKer worNers 
  0 10 20 30 40 
  0 200 200 200 200 200 
My KoXrs spent 10 130 20 20 20 20 
on ActiYity A 20 0 200 340 340 340 
  30 10 130 20 410 410 
  40 0 0 200 340 40 
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  Ce    
  %   14 
  )irm profit   100   4 î minHA 
  MinimXm of KoXrs spent on ActiYity A by tKe otKer worNers 
  0 10 20 30 40 
  0 200 200 200 200 200 
My KoXrs spent 10 120 20 20 20 20 
on ActiYity A 20 40 10 320 320 320 
  30 40 100 240 30 30 
  40 120 20 10 300 440 
 
  Ce   9 
  %   14 
  )irm profit   100   4 î minHA 
  MinimXm of KoXrs spent on ActiYity A by tKe otKer worNers 
  0 10 20 30 40 
  0 200 200 200 200 200 
My KoXrs spent 10 110 250 250 250 250 
on ActiYity A 20 20 10 300 300 300 
  30 0 0 210 350 350 
  40 10 20 120 20 400 
 
  Ce   10 
  %   14 
  )irm profit   100   4 î minHA 
  MinimXm of KoXrs spent on ActiYity A by tKe otKer worNers 
  0 10 20 30 40 
  0 200 200 200 200 200 
My KoXrs spent 10 100 240 240 240 240 
on ActiYity A 20 0 140 20 20 20 
  30 100 40 10 320 320 
  40 200 0 0 220 30 
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  Ce   13 
  %   14 
  )irm profit   100   4 î minHA 
  MinimXm of KoXrs spent on ActiYity A by tKe otKer worNers 
  0 10 20 30 40 
  0 200 200 200 200 200 
My KoXrs spent 10 0 210 210 210 210 
on ActiYity A 20 0 0 220 220 220 
  30 190 50 90 230 230 
  40 320 10 40 100 240 
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A33E1',; % 
 
Treatment Effects: The regressions shown in Table %.1 provide a formal statistical backing for our 
conclusions about the effects of the various treatments on subMect choices.  Models 1 and 1a look at firm
level data with the minimum effort as the dependent variable while Models 2 and 2a look at employee
level data with effort as the dependent variable.  *iven that these dependent variables are ordered 
categories, use of an ordered probit specification is natural.30  %oth data sets include all observations from 
all seven treatments for 5ounds 11 ± 30.  6ince there are four employees per firm, Model 2 has four times 
as many observations as Model 1.  The independent variables include a dummy for 5ounds 21 ± 30 and 
interaction terms between treatment dummies and dummies for 5ounds 11 ± 20 and 5ounds 21 ± 30.  
These interaction terms capture differences between the treatment and the base for the time period in 
question.  Models 1 and 1a differ only in what treatment is used as the base ± the 1o Help treatment in 
Model 1 and the Endogenous Help treatment in Model 1a.  Models 2 and 2a differ in the same manner.   
>7able % aboXt Kere@ 
6ince there are multiple observations from each firm, correcting for firm effects is a central issue 
in the regressions.  We do this in a couple of ways.  )irst, standard errors in both regressions are corrected 
for clustering Moulton, 19 Liang and =eger, 19 at the firm level.31  6econd, even though effort 
level zero is the unique equilibrium choice in 5ounds 1 ± 10, the maMority of employees 0 choose 
positive effort at least once in this first phase.  We therefore controls for behavior in 5ounds 1 ± 10 with 
the idea that this will pick up an individual andor group tendency to choose higher effort levels.  
6pecifically we include the firm¶s average minimum effort in 5ounds 1 ± 10 and, in the regressions on 
employeelevel data, the employee¶s average effort over 5ounds 1 ± 10. 
We start by looking at the statistical support for Conclusion 1.  Looking at Models 1 and 1a, few 
significant differences are observed at the firmlevel between the three initial treatments 1o Help, 
6ymmetric Costs, and Endogenous Help.  The only significant difference is between the Endogenous 
Help and 6ymmetric Costs treatments in 5ounds 21 ± 30, and this is only significant at the 10 level.  
Looking at employeelevel data, in Models 2 and 2a, even this difference fails to achieve statistical 
significance.  The regression results therefore support Conclusion 1 ± Endogenous Help does little to 
improve minimum effort levels and the positive effect of 6ymmetric costs is modest.   
                                                          
30 The cutoffs are not reported on Table %.1 since they are of little economic interest.  Copies of all regression output 
are available from the authors upon request. 
31 In Models 2 and 2a, observations from individuals in the same firm are obviously not independent.  We therefore 
cluster at the firm level rather than the employee level. 
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Turning to Conclusion 3, the regression analysis reported in Table %.1 also supports this 
conclusion.  Compared with either the 1o Help or Endogenous Help treatments, the )orced Commitment 
treatment leads to significantly higher minimum effort and effort levels in 5ounds 21 ± 30.  This effect is 
significant at the 5 level for all four models.32  If the regressions are altered so the base is the 6ymmetric 
Costs treatments, no significant differences are found between this treatment and )orced Commitment.   
The regressions provide strong support for Conclusion 4.  Compared with the 1o Help treatment, 
Direct Help without Commitment leads to significantly lower minimum effort and effort throughout 
5ounds 11 ± 30.  This effect is always significant at the 1 level.  In contrast the effect of Direct Help 
with Commitment as compared with the 1o Help treatment is always small and never approaches 
statistical significance at the 10 level.  The difference between the two direct help treatments is always 
statistically significant at the 1 level. 
 
Effects of Changing Help:  Table %.2 shows the results of ordered probit regressions capturing the 
relation between changes in help and changes in the effort level.  These provide backing for Conclusion 2.  
The dataset is all observations where help was available 5ounds 11 ± 30 for the Endogenous Help 
treatment.  Model 1 uses firmlevel data with the dependent variable being the minimum effort chosen by 
the firm¶s three low ability types in the current round.  Model 2 uses employeelevel data from low ability 
types only.  The dependent variable is the chosen effort level for the current round. As should be clear 
from )igures 2 and 3, the current round and the lagged minimum effort both play an important role in 
determining how the minimum effort changes beyond any change in the level of help provided.  To 
control for these effects, both regressions include dummies for the current round as well as dummies for 
each possible value of the lagged dependent variable.33  3arameter estimates for these dummies and the 
cutoffs are not reported in Table %.2 since they are not of direct interest.  Copies of the full regression 
output are available from the authors upon request.  With the inclusion of lagged dependent variables, the 
estimated parameters capture how the independent variables affect changes in the minimum effort.  The 
primary independent variables are the current level of help, the increase in help from the previous round 
interacted with a dummy for a positive change in help, and the decrease in help from the previous 
                                                          
32 As a simple alternative to running ordered probits, we can calculate nonparametric tests where the unit of 
observation is average minimum effort for a group in 5ounds 2 ± 30 e.g. the late rounds where convergence has 
taken place.  8sing a MannWhitney test, a relatively low powered test, the difference between 1o Help and )orced 
Commitment is significant at the 10 level and the difference between Endogenous Help and )orced Commitment 
is significant at the 5 level. 
33 Inclusion of round dummies also controls for the effect of the bonus rate increase prior to 5ound 11. To avoid 
colinearity, the dummies for 5ound 11 and lagged minimum effort   0 are dropped. 
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interacted with a dummy for a negative change in help.34  6tandard errors are corrected for clustering at 
the firm level. 
>7able % aboXt Kere@ 
Looking at Model 1, the two coefficients for changes in the level of help are both strongly 
significant, while the coefficient for the current level of help is not.  The negative coefficient for negative 
help changes is almost three times as large ± in absolute terms  as the positive one for positive help 
changes.  The difference between the absolute values of these two parameters is statistically significant at 
the 1 level.  The main results for Model 2 are much the same the level of help does not have a 
significant effect and the negative effect of decreasing help is roughly three times as large as the positive 
effect of increasing help with the difference being statistically significant at the 1 level.  One possible 
explanation for the asymmetric response of minimum effort to changes in help is strictly mechanical ± 
three individuals need to respond positively to increased help to raise the minimum effort for low ability 
types, but only one needs to to respond negatively to decreased help to lower the minimum effort. The 
results of Model 2 indicate that the disproportionate response to decreases is not caused by the minimum 
function emphasizing decreases.   
 
                                                          
34 To be clear, decreases are being measured as positive numbers.  )or example, if a high ability type decreases help 
from 2 to 0, the variable ³Decrease in Help  Change in Help   0´ equal 2, not 2. 
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Table 1:  Employee i’s Payoff Tables for B=8 
Ci = 1  Ci = 9 
   
  Minimum Effort  
by Other Employees 
   Minimum Effort  
by Other Employees 
  0 10 20 30 40    0 10 20 30 40 
Ef
fo
rt 
by
 
Em
pl
oy
ee
 i 0 200 200 200 200 200  
Ef
fo
rt 
by
 
Em
pl
oy
ee
 i 0 200 200 200 200 200 
10 190 270 270 270 270  10 110 190 190 190 190 
20 180 260 340 340 340  20 20 100 180 180 180 
30 170 250 330 410 410  30 -70 10 90 170 170 
40 160 240 320 400 480  40 -160 -80 0 80 160 
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Table 2: Employee i’s Payoff Tables for B=14 
Ci = 1  Ci = 9 
   
  Minimum Effort  
by Other Employees 
   Minimum Effort  
by Other Employees 
  0 10 20 30 40    0 10 20 30 40 
Ef
fo
rt 
by
 
Em
pl
oy
ee
 i 0 200 200 200 200 200  
Ef
fo
rt 
by
 
Em
pl
oy
ee
 i 0 200 200 200 200 200 
10 190 330 330 330 330  10 110 250 250 250 250 
20 180 320 460 460 460  20 20 160 300 300 300 
30 170 310 450 590 590  30 -70 70 210 350 350 
40 160 300 440 580 720  40 -160 -20 120 260 400 
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Table 3: List of Treatments of Experiment 1 
 
TREATMENT 
NAME NO HELP 
ENDOGENOUS 
HELP 
SYMMETRIC 
COSTS 
FORCED 
COMMITMENT
Player 1 Cost 
Block 1 1 1 1 1 
Player 1 Cost 
Blocks 2 and 3 1 
1 + 3H 
^ `H  1,2,3,4  7 
1 + 3H  (H fixed 
for block) 
Players 2, 3 & 4 Cost 
Block 1 9 9 9 9 
Players 2, 3 & 4 Cost 
Blocks 2 and 3 9 
9 – H 
 7 
9 – H 
(H fixed for 
block) 
Number of Firms 
(Number of Sessions) 
20 
(2 Sessions) 
39 
(5 Sessions) 
20 
(2 Sessions) 
20 
(2 sessions) 
   
  
^ `H  1, 2,3, 4
^ `H  1,2,3,4
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Table 4: Employee Payoff Tables with B = 14 and Ci = 7 for all Employees 
 
  Minimum Effort by Other Employees 
  0 10 20 30 40 
Ef
fo
rt 
by
 
Em
pl
oy
ee
 i 0 200 200 200 200 200 
10 130 270 270 270 270 
20 60 200 340 340 340 
30 -10 130 270 410 410 
40 -80 60 200 360 480 
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  Table 5:  Parameter Estimates of the Structural Model 
 
PARAMETER EXPLANATION ESTIMATE 
μ Over-optimism 0.046 (0.004) 
κ Reciprocity 0.012 (0.045) 
α Fraction of sophisticated players 0.657 (0.057) 
θ Fraction of type l players 0.089 (0.005) 
ഥ߱ Initial belief weight 0.202 (0.008) 
δ Hysteresis 0.303 (0.023) 
γ Belief weight slope term 0.178×10−4 (1.175×10−4) 
ρ Reset of belief weight 0.086 (0.006) 
λ Logit function parameter 0.072 (0.002) 
λH Logit parameter for help decisions
0.410 
(0.137) 
- Sum of squared errors 523.861 
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Table 6: Payoff Tables, High Ability Type Provides One Unit (10 Hours) of Help 
Ci = 1  Ci = 9 
  Minimum Effective Effort by Other Employees    
Minimum Effective Effort 
by Other Employees on Own Job 
  10 20 30 40 50    0 10 20 30 40 
Ef
fo
rt 
by
 
Em
pl
oy
ee
 I 
at
 O
w
n 
Jo
b 0 -70 -70 -70 -70 -70  
Ef
fo
rt 
by
 
Em
pl
oy
ee
 2
, 3
 o
r 4
 a
t 
O
w
n 
Jo
b 
10 200 340 340 340 340 
10 60 60 60 60 60  20 110 250 390 390 390 
20 50 190 190 190 190  30 20 160 300 440 440 
30 40 180 320 320 320  40 -70 70 210 350 490 
40 30 170 310 450 450  50 -160 -20 120 260 400 
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Table B.1:  Ordered Probit Regressions on Treatment Effects 
 
 Model 1 Model 1a Model 2 Model 2a 
Dependent Variable Minimum Effort 
Minimum 
Effort Effort Effort 
Unit of Observation Firm Firm Employee Employee 
Base  
Treatment No Help 
Endogenous 
Help No Help 
Endogenous 
Help 
Rounds 21 – 30 .197 (.129) 
.265**
(.106) 
-.030 
(.138) 
.053 
(.105) 
No Help 
* Rounds 11 – 20  
.103 
(.262)  
.035 
(.236) 
No Help 
* Rounds 21 – 30  
.035 
(.315)  
-.048 
(.292) 
Endogenous Help 
* Rounds 11 – 20 
-.103 
(.262)  
-.035 
(.236)  
Endogenous Help 
* Rounds 21 – 30 
-.035 
(.315)  
.048 
(.292)  
Symmetric Costs 
* Rounds 11 – 20 
.185 
(.288) 
.288 
(.258) 
.102 
(.287) 
.137 
(.255) 
Symmetric Costs 
* Rounds 21 – 30 
.496 
(.365) 
.532* 
(.315) 
.486 
(.351) 
.438 
(.304) 
Forced Commitment 
* Rounds 11 – 20 
.371 
(.329) 
.474 
(.297) 
.339 
(.313) 
.375 
(.278) 
Forced Commitment 
* Rounds 21 – 30 
.781** 
(.396) 
.816**
(.343) 
.799**
(.371) 
.751** 
(.322) 
Direct Help 
* Rounds 11 – 20 
-1.032***
(.261) 
-.929***
(.218) 
-.818***
(.246) 
-.783***
(.197) 
Direct Help 
* Rounds 21 – 30 
-1.556***
(.377) 
-1.521***
(.319) 
-1.380** 
(.310) 
-1.428***
(.244) 
Direct Help with Commitment 
* Rounds 11 – 20 
-.003 
(.253) 
.100 
(.220) 
.010 
(.232) 
.045 
(.192) 
Direct Help with Commitment 
* Rounds 21 – 30 
-.070 
(.328) 
-.034 
(.273) 
.094 
(.298) 
.046 
(.244) 
Ave. Min. Effort Rounds 1 – 
10 
.170 
(.109) 
.170 
(.109) 
.176*
(.105) 
.176* 
(.105) 
Average Effort, Rounds 1 – 
10   
.008 
(.006) 
.008 
(.006) 
Log-Likelihood -3686.89 -3686.89 -14584.60 -14584.60 
Number of Observations 2660 2660 10640 10640 
 
Notes:  Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the firm level.  Three (***), two (**), and 
one (*) stars indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.   
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Table B.2: The Effect of Changes in Help on Effort by Low Ability Types 
 
 Model 1 Model 2 
Dependent 
Variable 
Firm-Level Data 
Min. Effort, Low Ability Types 
Employee-Level Data 
Effort, Low Ability Types 
Current Level of Help .044 (.062) 
.045 
(.066) 
Increase in Help 
* (Change in Help >  0) 
.218*** 
(.082) 
.124** 
(.060) 
Decrease in Help 
* (Change in Help <  0) 
-.604*** 
(.137) 
-.377*** 
(.059) 
Log 
Likelihood -674.65 -2416.30 
Number  
of Observations 780 2340 
 
Notes:  Standard errors are corrected for clustering at the firm level.  Three (***), two (**), and one (*) 
stars indicate statistical significance at the 1%, 5%, and 10% respectively.   
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Figure 1. Minimum Effort
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Figure 2. Frequency of Changing Help, Minimum Effort, and High Ability Type Profits
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Figure 3. Effect of Changing Help on Low Ability Type Minimum Effort (Rounds 12-30)
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Figure 4. Comparison of Experimental and Simulated Data
Experimental Data
40
30
E
f f o
r t  
20m
u m
 E
M
i n
i m
10
No Helpe r
a g
e
0
 
Endogenous Help
Forced Commitment
A
v e
0 10 20 30
 
Round
Full Model
40
30
E
f f o
r t  
20m
u m
 E
M
i n
i m
10
No Helpe r
a g
e
0
 
Endogenous Help
Forced Commitment
A
v e
0 10 20 30
 
Round
No Sophisticated Learners
40
30
E
f f o
r t  
20m
u m
 E
M
i n
i m
10
No Helpe r
a g
e
0
 
Endogenous Help
Forced Commitment
A
v e
0 10 20 30
 
Round
Basic Model (No Overoptimism or Reciprocity)
40
30
E
f f o
r t  
20m
u m
 E
M
i n
i m
10
No Helpe r
a g
e
0
 
Endogenous Help
Forced Commitment
A
v e
0 10 20 30
 
Round
No Overoptimism & Fitted Reciprocity
40
30
E
f f o
r t  
20m
u m
 E
M
i n
i m
10
No Helpe r
a g
e
0
 
Endogenous Help
Forced Commitment
A
v e
0 10 20 30
 
Round
Fitted Overoptimism & Reciprocity   1
40
30
E
f f o
r t  
20m
u m
 E
M
i n
i m
10
No Helpe r
a g
e
0
 
Endogenous Help
Forced Commitment
A
v e
0 10 20 30
 
Round
Page 54 of 59
ScholarOne, 375 Greenbrier Drive, Charlottesville, VA, 22901
Management Science
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Figure 5. Minimum Effort in Experiment 2
40
30
m
 E
f f o
r t
20i v
e  
M
i n
i m
u
r a
g e
 E
f f e
c t
i
10
A v
e r
0
10 11 12 13 14 15 16 17 18 19 20 21 22 23 24 25 26 27 28 29 30
Round
Direct Help Direct Help with Forced Commitment No Help
Page 55 of 59
ScholarOne, 375 Greenbrier Drive, Charlottesville, VA, 22901
Management Science
1
2
3
4
5
6
7
8
9
10
11
12
13
14
15
16
17
18
19
20
21
22
23
24
25
26
27
28
29
30
31
32
33
34
35
36
37
38
39
40
41
42
43
44
45
46
47
48
49
50
51
52
53
54
55
56
57
58
59
60
Responses to Associate Editor 
 
Thank you for all of the effort you and the review team have put into this paper.  We realize that this went 
far beyond the ordinary and genuinely appreciate it.  Please find responses to your comments below. 
 
Note: Excerpted material from the letter is in normal print and our responses are in italics.   
 
First, and most importantly, you should add a couple of paragraphs in Section 6 (and other appropriate 
places in the paper) that motivates the use of your structural model. You should present ex ante arguments 
why such a structural model is promising/necessary/desirable in the first place and adds value to the 
paper. At appropriate places you should address why this is not just a fitting exercise. The fact that three 
members of your reviewer team, who all spent considerable time on your paper, were unconvinced by the 
value added of the structural model, should give you an incentive to sell your model better. Your letter of 
appeal contains many good arguments that have helped me to better understand the rationale of the 
model. 
 
We completely get your point.  It doesn’t matter how good we think the model if we cannot communicate 
its value to readers.  We have rewritten both the discussion of the model in the introduction as well as the 
material in Section 6.  Given your comment about the letter of appeal, much of the revision consists of 
taking the arguments from the letter of appeal and incorporating them into the paper.  We have tried to 
improve our explanation of the model, how the fitting and simulation exercises work, and what is learned 
from the model.  We hope the paper now sells the model. 
 
Second, you should pay attention to the comments by Reviewer 2 and address them as much as possible. 
 
Responses to Referee 2’s comments are below.  The most important is that, as suggested, we have 
shortened the discussion of Experiment 2.  This, along with tightening the exposition elsewhere, allowed 
us to explain the learning model in more detail without changing the length of the paper.  
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Responses to Referee 2 
 
Note: Excerpted material from the referee report is in normal print and our responses are in italics.   
 
1) As I mentioned in my previous report the results seem not to be very pronounced. Because of 
the small number of observations (20 in most of the treatments) the findings should be backed by non-
parametric statistics in addition to regression results. However, I could not find this backing in the results 
section, presumably because non-parametrically there are few differences between the treatments. 
 
Added. Results with non-parametrics parallel the regression results and are reported with them. 
 
2) The EWA-like model presented in the paper is not very convincing and the gained insights are 
limited. To me its assumptions and its modelling are so specific that it looks as if the authors selected it 
from a post-hoc process among other possible (maybe less supporting) models and specifications. 
 
We have rewritten the material describing the learning model.  We hope this makes it clearer what we 
learn from using this model, why the model is constructed as it is, and why the reciprocity term in the 
model is not statistically significant. 
 
3) In my view the authors are not able to convincingly pinpoint the causal reasons why the Forced 
Commitment treatment is more successful in establishing higher average minimum effort levels.  
 
We have tried to clarify why this treatment increases minimum effort level. 
 
4) The paper could be more focused. For example, the Symmetric Cost treatment does not add 
much to the main story and the contributions of Experiment 2 (the two treatments with direct help) to the 
commitment argument could be presented in a shorter and more concise way. 
 
We agree that the most important treatments are the No Help, Endogenous Help, and Commitment 
treatments and have tried to keep the focus on these three treatments.  In revising, our primary goal has 
been to better explain the learning model, but we have also tightened the exposition (especially in the 
discussion of Experiment 2 as per Referee 2’s comment).   
 
 
In my view Conclusion 4 is far too strong: “A model of sophisticated … best explains…”. It is far from 
clear that the chosen model best explains the experimental data. 
 
We have rewritten the material describing the learning model.  We hope this makes it more clear what we 
learn from using this model, why the model is constructed as it is, and why the reciprocity term in the 
model is not statistically significant. 
  
Minor comments 
 
Footnote 1: It should be “Drago and Garvey (1998)” and not “Drago and Harvey (1998)” 
 
Fixed. 
 
p. 5: The sentence “Adding reciprocity to the model therefore decreases…” is very difficult to grasp. 
 
Rewritten to, hopefully, be clearer. 
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p. 7: In my printout it reads Ei 0 {0, 10, 20, 30, 40}. 
 
Fixed.   
 
p. 9: What does the sentence “Finally, both indirect and direct help are natural in the context of escaping 
performance traps.” exactly mean? Is there any evidence for this? 
 
This has been rephrased.  Hopefully it should be clearer that the types of help the can be offered in the 
lab experiment can be easily interpreted in terms of types of help that can be offered in a field setting. 
 
p. 18: “are equally likely to be” instead of “are equally like to be” 
 
Fixed. 
 
p. 19: What is the meaning of “omega upper bar” 
 
We have clarified this point. 
 
p. 20: Please, explain “Occam’s Razor” or do not use the term.  
 
Rewritten without using this term. 
 
p. 25: “average minimum effort will be higher” instead of “average minimum effort with be higher” 
 
Fixed. 
 
Figure 5 is hard to read since the line markers are too similar 
 
Fixed. 
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Management Science Data Disclosure Checklist 
 
Please complete this form, save it as “Data Disclosure Checklist,” and upload it as a separate file after 
your submitted manuscript. It will be available to the entire review team, so please do not include 
author names. This page does not count toward the page limit on the manuscript. 
 
 
Title of manuscript:  
 
Stand By Me. Experiments on Help and Commitment in Coordination Games. 
 
Indicate (e.g., by underlining) “Yes” or “No”: 
 
Yes    No    This manuscript includes analysis of data, either field data, simulated data, or 
experimental data. 
 
Yes    No    If our manuscript is accepted we will provide the journal with our data so that it can 
be posted on the journal’s website. To promote additional research and to increase 
the credibility of a paper’s findings, data disclosure is encouraged but not required. 
 
Yes    No    A portion of our data cannot be disclosed due to a non-disclosure agreement or 
similar limitations on disclosure. If “Yes,” briefly explain which data cannot be 
disclosed and why:  
 
 
 
For papers that report experimental data, please answer the following: 
 
Yes    No    We report how we determined our sample sizes, all data exclusions (if any), all 
manipulations (for experimental work), and all measures collected. 
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